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On the widely differing effects of free trade agreements:








Abstract. We develop a novel two stage methodology that allows us to study the empirical determinants of
the ex post effects of past free trade agreements (FTAs) as well as obtain ex ante predictions for the effects
of future FTAs. We first identify 908 unique estimates of the effects of FTAs on different trading pairs
for the years 1986-2006. We then employ these estimates as our dependent variable in a “second stage”
analysis characterizing the heterogeneity in these effects. Interestingly, most of this heterogeneity (∼ 2/3)
occurs within FTAs (rather than across different FTAs), with asymmetric effects within pairs (on exports vs.
imports) also playing an important role. Our second stage analysis provides several intuitive explanations
behind these variations. Even within the same agreement, FTA effects are weaker for more distant pairs
and for pairs with otherwise high levels of ex ante trade frictions. The effects of new FTAs are similarly
weaker for pairs with existing agreements already in place. In addition, we are able to relate asymmetries
in FTA effects to each country’s ability to influence the other’s terms of trade. Out-of-sample predictions
incorporating these insights enable us to predict direction-specific effects of future FTAs between any pair
of countries. A simulation of the general equilibrium effects of TTIP demonstrates the significance of our
methods.
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1 Introduction
After a quarter-century of unprecedented trade integration, the world may be taking a momentary
pause to re-evaluate the economic impact of free trade agreements. The past few years have seen
the United Kingdom threaten to leave the E.U., the United States insist on the re-negotiation of
NAFTA, and the high profile failures of TTIP and TPP - two would-be “mega deals” which together
would have made 60% of the world’s production more interdependent by eliminating barriers to
trade. While economic integration has always been controversial, a common theme in the current
backlash against FTAs is the perception that past FTAs have not provided the economic benefits
promised by policymakers at the time of their signing. Since the broader trend towards ever larger
and more comprehensive trade deals seems unlikely to abate, the current moment thus offers an
opportunity to take stock of the heterogeneous effects of past FTAs on bilateral trade flows ex post
to see if these effects reflect the wisdom of established theory and to determine what lessons we
can draw to better predict the effects of future FTAs ex ante.
The proliferation of new FTAs in recent years offers a useful historical lens for studying how
trade agreements achieve liberalization that goes beyond the simple elimination of tariffs. Since
1986, there have been more than 350 new trade agreements notified to the WTO, which have
differed in their aim, breadth, and scope. Broadly speaking, however, a shared objective of many
of these agreements has been to achieve “deep” integration, i.e., economic integration that goes
beyond tariff reduction and extends into policies that are more difficult for the econometrician to
observe and to quantify. Leading econometric studies of the “average partial effect” of FTAs on
trade, such as Baier & Bergstrand (2007) and Anderson & Yotov (2016), generally support this
view, as the estimates they obtain appear too large to be explained by tariff reductions alone.1
As a result, those wishing to model the effects of FTAs ex ante face a fundamental prob-
lem: how to assess their initial, partial equilibrium impact on bilateral trade. If FTAs affect trade
1For example, Baier et al. (2014) find that “deeper” agreements have stronger effects and Baier et al. (2018) find
that ex post FTA effects can depend on ex ante geographic and institutional frictions, such as bilateral distance and
the sharing of a common legal system. Incorporating more specific variation in agreement types (e.g., the inclusion of
certain provisions) should be regarded as an important direction to pursue, but efforts thus far have only yielded mixed
results (see: Kohl et al. 2016).
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only through tariffs, this partial effect could be computed directly (assuming a constant elasticity).
However, in combination, the small current levels of tariffs and the large FTA estimates from the
existing literature support the conclusion that the effects of FTAs on bilateral trade go far beyond
the simple elimination of tariffs. To allow for such possibilities, a growing number of researchers
use econometric estimates of the ex post effects of existing FTAs (often just a single average esti-
mate) as a proxy for the effects of future agreements.2 However, aside from variation in tariffs (or,
more nebulously, in “non-tariff measures”, NTMs), few theoretically-grounded arguments exist for
why these partial effects might differ systematically across different agreements.
Accordingly, the main goal of this paper is to develop methods and hypotheses that will identify
meaningful, theoretically-motivated sources of variation for predicting the effects of trade deals ex
ante. In particular, we pursue a “two stage” estimation procedure for quantifying and studying
heterogeneity in the effects of FTAs, using data on trade and production for 70 countries over
the period 1986-2006. In a first stage, we expand on the methods of Baier & Bergstrand (2007)
and Bergstrand et al. (2015) to obtain agreement-specific effects for each FTA signed during the
period, as well as “direction-of-trade”-specific estimates for each member pairing within a given
agreement. This stage of the analysis delivers a total of 908 direction-specific, widely-varying FTA
estimates, which we then use as dependent variables in a second stage that studies the determinants
of the variance in the FTA estimates.
To help explain this heterogeneity, we seek guidance from theory. Specifically, we exploit the
basic structure of a standard multi-country trade model to examine two novel sources of variation.
First, to the extent that some trade frictions are induced by trade policies and domestic regulations,
pairs of countries with higher levels of trade frictions ex ante should have more potential for larger
FTA partial effects ex post. Second, drawing on the influential “terms of trade” arguments of
Bagwell & Staiger (1999, 2005), countries with less “market power” over their own terms of
trade should grant relatively smaller concessions when they sign FTAs, because they are likely
2Aichele et al. (2014), Felbermayr et al. (2015), Anderson et al. (2015), and Carrère et al. (2015) each use econo-
metric estimates of the average effect of past agreements to model the effects of TTIP (as well as TPP, in the case of
Carrère et al., 2015).
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already close to their “politically optimal” set of trade policies. To operationalize these insights,
we introduce two indices: (i) a comprehensive index of “pre-FTA trade barriers”, which we obtain
naturally from our econometric first stage model, and (ii) a simulated measure of each member of
an agreement’s “terms of trade sensitivity”, which, to emphasize the connection with the theories
of Bagwell & Staiger, we also refer to as “revealed market power”. Our analysis finds robust
support for both of these hypotheses.
We also confirm two other intuitively plausible hypotheses that can account for a fraction of
the observed heterogeneity. First, countries with a prior trade agreements already in place tend to
have weaker partial effects from any subsequent agreements. Second, even after controlling for
the level of existing trade frictions, FTA partial effects are weaker for countries which are further
apart geographically. This may be because more distant countries are less sensitive to changes in
trade policies (as emphasized in Baier et al., 2018) or perhaps because they find it more difficult to
coordinate on deeper integration because of weaker cultural affinities.
One other variable that has been highlighted in the broader literature on FTAs also draws our
interest. Following the work of Kehoe & Ruhl (2013) on the “new goods” margin of trade - as well
as subsequent work by Kehoe et al. (2015) - we test whether countries that trade a relatively small
range of products ex ante have more potential for “explosive” trade creation after the signing of
an FTA. Interestingly, we find that the number of products trade ex ante is, if anything, positively
related to the amount of trade creation ex post, seemingly contradicting these earlier findings.
Two remarks help reconcile this discrepancy. First, to the extent that a low traded goods margin
manifests itself in a “gravity” framework as high trade costs, our comprehensive index of “pre-FTA
trade barriers” already takes this margin into account. Second, the distinction between “across-”
versus “within-” agreement heterogeneity is again important here. In particular, when we restrict
our focus to asymmetric FTA effects within the same pair of countries - better approximating the
case study design used in Kehoe & Ruhl (2013) and Kehoe et al. (2015) - we do find that a low
traded goods margin helps predict asymmetries in trade creation.
In light of recent trends towards larger multilateral trade blocs, an especially appealing aspect of
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our two stage approach is that we can easily narrow our focus to heterogeneous effects that might
occur within individual agreements.3 Interestingly, we find that variation in FTA effects across
different agreements (i.e., the difference between NAFTA and Mercosur) explains only about one-
third of the variation in our first stage estimates of FTA effects. Of the remaining two-thirds, which
are due to “within agreement” heterogeneity, almost half (i.e., almost one-third of the total) is due
to asymmetric effects “within pairs”. With the exception of prior agreements, our key variables
of interest remain relevant when we limit attention to heterogeneity within agreements. We are
also specifically able to relate asymmetries in trade creation within pairs to differences in market
power, as would be predicted by terms-of-trade theory.
We subject these insights to a battery of other controls that may be plausibly linked to trade cre-
ation, including “gravity” relationships, depth of the agreements, factor endowment differences, in-
stitutional frictions to trade, and ex ante tariff policies. These additional regressions reveal several
useful auxiliary findings. For example, we find that our preferred second stage model significantly
outperforms observed tariffs in explaining the heterogeneity in our FTA estimates, especially when
we consider heterogeneity “within agreements” and “within pairs”. Information on factor endow-
ments and/or institutional development similarly only seems useful for predicting the heterogeneity
that occurs across agreements; they are silent as to why the same agreement could have different
effects for different members. We do, however, find robust evidence that FTA effects are larger for
countries with larger economic size (GDP).
By design, our two stage approach is well-suited for developing and validating a model for
making ex ante predictions. Drawing on the machine learning literature, we use an “out of sam-
ple” prediction analysis to test if an empirical model fitted from the first stage estimates of one
set of agreements can reliably predict the partial effects found in the excluded agreements.4 As an
illustration, we use the predictive model developed from this out-of-sample analysis to generate
3Very few papers in the literature allow the same agreement to have different effects on different members. Baier
et al. (2018) allows for this type of heterogeneity by interacting their EIA dummies with ex ante pair-specific relation-
ships, rather than conditioning on agreement-specific variables. Our two stage approach combines the perspective of
Baier et al. (2018) with that of Zylkin (2015), who allows for direction-of-trade-specific effects within NAFTA.
4In practice, we drop one agreement at a time, then try to predict its effects out of sample.
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unique, direction-of-trade-specific predicted partial effects of a revived TTIP on trade between the
U.S. and E.U. Compared with an alternate scenario in which TTIP has the same partial effect on
all TTIP trade flows (as is typically assumed in other analyses), we find that allowing for hetero-
geneous partial effects has important consequences for how TTIP affects welfare, which follow
directly from the empirical insights we document in the second stage analysis. In this way, our
three-part approach offers a cohesive methodology for studying and predicting heterogeneous ef-
fects of FTAs: the first stage creates preliminary objects of interest, the second stage provides a
thorough empirical deconstruction, and the third part demonstrates a novel method for making ex
ante predictions that highlights and validates the practical usefulness of the first two parts.
Naturally, our approach is complementary to the prevailing, non-econometric methods that
have been used to model the effect of trade policies ex ante. Because FTAs have shifted their focus
away from tariffs, applied work in the CGE literature increasingly aims to quantify the impact of
non-tariff provisions of FTAs on so-called “non-tariff barriers”. However, as discussed in Fugazza
& Maur (2008), because of the complexity of these issues, even the best-possible estimates of non-
tariff barriers must be interpreted with caution and model results based on these estimates may be
highly fragile to minor variations in methodology. Our methods admittedly lack the specificity of
a fully-specified CGE framework. Nonetheless, we are able to identify several broad sources of
variation in FTA effects that have been previously overlooked, have strong theoretical and intuitive
appeal, and appear to have robust support in the data.
Lastly, because we allow FTA effects to differ by agreement, we also contribute to a longstand-
ing literature that has examined the effects of individual agreements. This literature begins with the
seminal work of Tinbergen (1962), who found only small effects for the Benelux and British Com-
monwealth preference arrangements, and also includes other influential studies by Frankel & Wei
(1997) and Carrère (2006), who allow for differences across several major modern regional trading
blocs. Methodologically, the most related work in this area is Kohl (2014), who observes that FTA
effects may differ based on WTO membership and on the institutional quality of an agreement. By
and large, these studies have not found that most FTAs have increased trade. For example, Kohl
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(2014) finds only 27% of FTAs have had positive and significant effects on trade. We, however,
find positive effects for a majority (57%) of the agreements in our study. This could be for three
reasons. First, we follow the econometric recommendations of Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) in
using Poisson PML, as opposed to OLS, in order to account for heteroskedasticity of trade data and
to be able to use the information contained in zero trade flows. Second, we include consistently-
measured internal trade flows, which enable us to capture the possibility that increases in trade
between liberalizing countries may actually be at the expense of internal trade.5 Third, bilateral
trade flows may not instantaneously respond to the implementation of an FTA. To account for
the phasing-in of different provisions and other adjustments that may accompany FTAs, we allow
agreements to have lagged effects that accumulate over time.
The following section describes the first stage estimation procedure. Section 3 adds details on
how we construct our data and key variables. Section 4 summarizes our first stage FTA estimates.
These estimates are then used as the dependent variables in the second stage analysis, which is
contained in Section 5. Section 6 uses the insights from the second stage to forecast the effects of
TTIP. Finally, Section 7 adds concluding remarks.
2 Decomposition of FTA Effects
This section describes how we recover heterogeneous estimates of the effects of FTAs. We start
with a brief review of the structural gravity model, which delivers an estimating equation for the
“average partial effect” of an FTA. We then discuss how to decompose this average effect into
successively nested layers of heterogeneity, starting with the level of the individual agreement and
then allowing for an increasingly more detailed heterogeneity within agreements as well.
2.1 Structural Gravity
Our starting point is a simple, generalized version of the “structural gravity” equation, as originally
derived by Anderson (1979) and as popularized by Eaton & Kortum (2002) and Anderson & van
5This idea has been explored in the context of FTAs by Dai et al. (2014) and by Bergstrand et al. (2015).
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Wincoop (2003) and subsequently extended to the panel dimension by Baier & Bergstrand (2007).6
Let Xi j denote the value of exports from an origin country i to a destination country j. The gravity








E j . (1)
In (1), E j is the total expenditure by purchasers in j on goods across all different origins (including
goods produced domestically in j). The share of j’s expenditure allocated specifically to products
from any one origin i is then directly dependent on the following three factors: Ai, the overall
quality of the production technologies available in i; wi, the wage in i; and τi j , the “iceberg” trade
cost required to send goods from i to j. Goods from different origins are assumed to be imperfectly
substitutable; therefore, the effects of production costs and trade costs on trade are subject to a
constant trade elasticity θ > 1. Importantly, all cost factors only weigh on trade relative to the
overall degree of competition in j’s import market, which is accounted for via the summation term
in the denominator of (1). Noting that this summation term is specific to the importing country











i j . As noted by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), P
−θ
j serves as a useful
aggregate of all bilateral trade costs faced by consumers in importer j.7 Writing the structural
gravity equation as in (2) - with distinct i, j, and i-by- j components - lends itself naturally to
deriving a “fixed effects” estimation equation for trade flows, as we demonstrate below.
6More recently, Arkolakis et al. (2012), Costinot & Rodríguez-Clare (2014), and Head & Mayer (2014) have each
shown that the basic empirical structure implied by these earlier papers - gravity estimation with exporter and importer
fixed effects - is consistent with a wide range of other trade models, including Armington (1969), Krugman (1980),
Melitz (2003), and Melitz & Ottaviano (2008).
7Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) famously refer to P−θj as j’s “inward multilateral resistance”. They also show
how to derive a seller-side analogue to P−θj (the “outward multilateral resistance”) that similarly aggregates bilateral
trade costs for producers in exporter i. By performing this exercise, Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) show how (1)
can be re-written in the form of a more traditional gravity equation, in which both countries’ “economic mass” (i.e.,
GDP) enters directly.
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2.2 Panel Econometric Implementation
From an empirical perspective, our primary object of interest is the combined trade frictions pa-
rameter τ−θi j . We are not, however, interested in the general determinants of trade frictions - e.g.,
geographical distance, historical affinities, etc. - which have been widely explored in the broader
gravity literature.8 Rather, we wish to focus on how FTAs have shaped changes in τ−θi j over time.
More specifically, we aim to shed light on how different agreements have had very different effects
on τ−θi j and, furthermore, how changes in τ
−θ
i j may vary widely even within the same agreement.
Our first step in this direction is to follow Baier & Bergstrand (2007) in deriving a panel im-
plementation of (2) that permits identification of an average FTA effect across all the agreements
in our sample. To ease this derivation, we first add a time subscript, t, as well as an error term, εi j,t ,
and re-write (2) in exponential form:
Xi j,t = exp
(





+ εi j,t . (3)
Next, use the following generic functional form for the trade costs term lnτ−θi j,t
lnτ−θi j,t = Zi jδ+ β1FT Ai j,t + β2FT Ai j,t−5+ui j,t,
where Zi j can be thought of a set of time-invariant controls for the general level of trade costs
between i and j with coefficient vector δ. For more traditional gravity applications, the contents of
Zi j would normally be specified to include geographical and/or historical ties between countries,
as discussed above. For our purposes, however, the main variables of interest are FT Ai j,t , a 0/1
indicator for if i and j belong to a common free trade agreement at time t, and FT Ai j,t−5, a 5 year
lag of FT Ai j,t . The inclusion of this lagged term accounts for the possibility that FTA effects may
“phase-in” over time, as has been previously shown by such papers as Baier & Bergstrand (2007)
and Anderson & Yotov (2016).9
8For a thorough reference, see Anderson & van Wincoop (2004).
9Our specific choice of a single 5 year lag reflects a compromise between allowing for phasing-in effects and trying
to identify lags for as many agreements as possible. However, we have also thoroughly examined robustness to other
possible ways of specifying the timing of effects. For the aggregate analysis, we have experimented with 2-12 year
lags as well as with 1-6 year leads. The results, shown in our Online Appendix, reveal the average phasing-in period
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A concern that arises is that there are components of Zi j that are unobserved and correlated
with FTAs, and not accounting for these factors will result in biased coefficient estimates. A
key insight from Baier & Bergstrand (2007) is that specific knowledge of δ is neither necessary
nor sufficient in order to obtain consistent estimates of the effects of FTAs. Instead, drawing on
standard panel estimation techniques described in Wooldridge (2002), Baier & Bergstrand (2007)
recommend using pair-specific fixed effects in place of Zi jδ, such that the time dimension of the
panel identifies the (average) causal effect of FTAs on trade. With this same strategy in mind, our
baseline specification for estimating the average effect of FTAs on trade barriers becomes
Xi j,t = exp
(
ηi,t +ψ j,t +γi j + β1FT Ai j,t + β2FT Ai j,t−5
)
+ εi j,t . (4)
Here, ηi,t and ψ j,t are, respectively, time-varying exporter- and importer- fixed effects meant to
absorb the ln Ai,tw−θi,t and ln E j,t/P
−θ
j,t terms in (3), which are endogenous and cannot be observed
directly. In addition, ηi,t and ψ j,t also effectively control for all country-level factors on the exporter
and on the importer side, respectively. γi j is a (symmetric) pair-wise fixed effect that strips out
all time-invariant determinants of trade barriers between i and j.10 Lastly, we treat the additive
residual term εi j,t as both reflecting measurement error in trade values as well as now also absorbing
the error term in lnτ−θi j,t above. Following the recommendations of Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006,
2011), we estimate (4) - as well as all subsequent specifications described in this section - using
Poisson Pseudo-maximum Likelihood (“PPML”).11
We obtain our final baseline specification for estimating the effects of FTAs by incorporating
of the FTAs in our sample is well-approximated by a 5 year lag. We also find that none of the leads are statistically or
economically significant.
10Baier & Bergstrand (2007) estimate two versions of (4), one with bilateral fixed effects and one in log-differences,
such that the pair fixed effects drop out of the estimation. Because we estimate in levels using symmetric fixed effects,
our specific implementation draws more directly on Anderson & Yotov (2016). Later, when we allow for asymmetric
FTA effects, it is necessary to also use asymmetric pair effects in order to obtain unbiased estimates. In general,
however, imposing symmetry on the pair effects leads to more efficient estimates, because it reduces the number of
parameters to be estimated. Thus, we stick with symmetric pair effects for our initial specifications.
11By using PPML, we implicitly assume that the the variance of εi j,t is proportional to the conditional mean of Xi j,t .
Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006, 2011) show that PPML generates relatively robust results even when this assumption
is not satisfied and/or the data features many zero trade values. Arvis & Shepherd (2013) and Fally (2015) offer
further reasons for PPML’s suitability in the gravity context. Egger & Staub (2015) and Head & Mayer (2014) provide
a broader comparison between PPML and other, non-GLM estimators not considered in Santos Silva & Tenreyro
(2006). Piermartini & Yotov (2016) offer broader discussion of the econometric challenges associated with gravity
estimation as well as recommended best practices.
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the methods of Bergstrand et al. (2015), who argue that FTA estimates based on specification
(4) may be biased upward because they may be capturing the effects of globalization. Adapting
a related idea from Yotov (2012), the simple adjustment proposed by Bergstrand et al. (2015)
is to explicitly control for the effects of globalization in the gravity model by introducing a set of
globalization dummies. Applied to our setting, this adjustment results in the following econometric
model:
Xi j,t = exp
(





+ εi j,t, (5)
where the added term
∑
t bt is a set of dummies that equal 1 for international trade observations
(as opposed to internal trade, Xii) at each time t. The coefficients on these time-varying border
dummies, the bt’s, capture the process of globalization over time, as all countries trade more with
each other and less with their own internal markets.
The average “total” (or “cumulative”) effect of FTAs on trade after accounting for phasing-in
can be constructed as β ≡ β1+ β2. The specific interpretation of β can be described in one of two
ways. From a strictly econometric point of view, β is the total average partial effect of an FTA
on bilateral trade flows, noting that FTAs also influence trade through the country-specific terms
ηi,t and ψ j,t . A second, more structural interpretation is that β gives the average treatment effect
of an FTA specifically on “trade costs” - i.e., its effect on the lnτ−θi j,t term in (3). To ease this latter
interpretation, note that the combined term exp(γi j + bt + β1FT Ai j,t + β2FT Ai j,t−5) describes the
predicted level of τ−θi j,t in place between countries i and j at time t. To comment more thoroughly
on the identification of β, note that increases in trade between i and j do not translate directly to
implied reductions in the trade cost term lnτ−θi j,t . Instead, due to the presence of the time-varying
exporter and importer fixed effects, the impact of FTAs is only identifiable when trade increases
between i and j relative to each country’s trade with all other partners. Importantly, and consistent
with theory, the set of outside partners for each country includes the value for Xii, the value of sales
to one’s own market, or “internal trade”. We regard accounting for internal trade as a key feature of
our empirical approach. As documented empirically in Dai et al. (2014), including internal trade
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in the estimation should lead to larger, more precise estimates of FTA effects.12
2.3 Allowing for FTA heterogeneity
With the wide adoption of Baier & Bergstrand’s methods, most estimates of the effects of FTAs
in the prior literature generally find positive and significant “average” results.13 However, for the
purposes of policy analysis, an obvious weakness of estimating an “average” FTA effect is that
the effects of a given agreement may be substantially different from the average; thus, it may not
be appropriate to apply an average estimate of the effects of all existing FTAs for making ex ante
predictions about the effects of specific FTAs. To capture and analyze this potential heterogeneity
in FTA effects, we expand on the initial specification shown in (5) in three successive steps:
First, we consider a specification where FTA effects are allowed to vary at the level of the
underlying agreement, similar to the approach taken in Kohl (2014):14
Xi j,t = exp
(
ηi,t +ψ j,t +γi j +
∑
A








+ εi j,t, (6)
where we allow for a distinct average partial effect - βA ≡ β1,A+ β2,A - for each individual agree-
ment, using superscript A to index by agreement and also allowing for agreement-specific lags.
This initial refinement allows us to make useful statements about which FTAs in our sample have
been more successful than others about promoting trade. However, it is silent about the possibility
that the same agreement may not affect all countries involved in exactly the same way.
Second, we allow for further heterogeneity at the level of each trading pair within an agreement.
For example, we allow Sweden’s accession to the E.U. in 1995 to have different effects on its trade
barriers with Germany vs. its trade barriers with the U.K. The resulting specification is
Xi j,t = exp
(















+ εi j,t, (7)
where each p ∈ A is a pair of countries (i, j) belonging to agreement A, counting (i, j) and ( j, i) as
12Indeed, as we will later show, our accounting for internal trade allows us to obtain substantially more “optimistic”
estimates of the effects of individual agreements than the prior literature.
13We note some exceptions to this statement: Frankel et al. (1997); Ghosh & Yamarik (2004); Head & Mayer
(2014). These papers differ methodologically from the approach used in Baier & Bergstrand (2007), however.
14For earlier work, see also: Frankel & Wei (1997), Soloaga & Winters (2001), and Carrère (2006).
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the same pair. βA:p ≡ β1,A:p + β2,A:p then gives us a corresponding set of agreement-pair-specific
FTA estimates.
Third, we consider the possibility that, even within a given pair, an FTA may not affect trade
in both directions symmetrically. For this last refinement, let d ∈ A denote a unique “directional
pair” of countries (
−→
i, j) belonging to agreement A, where the notation (
−→
i, j) refers specifically to the
effect on trade flows where i is the exporter and j is the importer. We thus estimate two effects for
each agreement-pair, one for each direction of trade. In addition, since FTAs no longer affect each
partner symmetrically within a given pair, we now also introduce an asymmetric pair fixed effect
“γ−→
i j
”, which varies by direction as well. We then have the following econometric model:
Xi j,t = exp
(















+ εi j,t, (8)
βA:d ≡ β1,A:d + β2,A:d then gives us a unique set of direction-specific estimates which we will soon
use for our “second stage” analysis of the empirical determinants of trade integration.
Before proceeding further, we pause to clarify two important details. First, the heterogeneous
FTA estimates that will be obtained from specifications (6), (7), and (8) should be interpreted
with care. While Baier & Bergstrand (2007) has emerged as the standard method for consistently
estimating the average treatment effect of FTAs, the same cannot be said when we pull apart our
average “β” to obtain increasingly more finely-grained coefficients, which we should regard as
being estimated with at least some unobserved error. Instead, our preferred method draws on the
suggested approach of Lewis & Linzer (2005): even if the individual βA:d’s we estimate from
contain some unobserved noise, we can still investigate heterogeneity in the causal effects of FTAs
by using a “second stage” regression analysis to extract some useful signals from that noise.15
Second, our desire to allow for individual lagged effects creates an additional complication
because it is not possible to estimate 5 year lagged effects for the agreements that form within
15Formally speaking, what we have in our βA:d’s (for example) is a measure of how a particular τi j,t changed
for a given FTA and direction of trade. These direction-specific changes in trade barriers could be due to the FTAs
themselves or could be because of “noisier” reasons (changes in wind patterns, for instance). What we require for
causal interpretation of our second stage estimates is that the “noise” in our first stage is uncorrelated with our second
stage covariates. We return to this consideration in more detail in Section 5.
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the last 5 years. While we could drop these later agreements from the sample, doing so effectively
discards the useful information in the contemporaneous FTA effects β1,A, β1,A:p, and β1,A:d . Instead,
our preferred way of addressing this issue is to use the direction-specific estimates (the βA:d’s) from
the first 15 years of data to estimate the following auxiliary regression
β2,A:d = π0+ π1β1,A:d +υA:d, (9)
such that we may then infer the needed remaining lags using β2,A:d = π0 + π1β1,A:d . We use the
same coefficients to infer missing values for β2,A’s and β2,A:p’s where needed.16
3 Data Construction
This section describes the sources and the construction of the data with emphasis on several spe-
cially constructed indices that are theoretically motivated and used as key regressors in our second
stage analysis in Section 5. These indices include our novel measures of “pre-FTA trade barriers”
and “revealed market power”, as well as the “new goods” margin of Kehoe & Ruhl (2013).
3.1 Trade and FTA Data for First Stage Analysis
Trade. We construct a data set with information on manufacturing production and trade for a
sample of 70 countries over the twenty year period 1986 - 2006.17 Table A.1 of the Data Appendix
lists the countries included. For computational reasons, we combine 17 countries which do not
form any FTAs during the period into a single “Rest of the World” aggregate region. Thus, in the
end, we arrive at a balanced panel of 53 trading regions observed over the 21 year period 1986-
2006.18 Our primary source for bilateral trade flows is UN COMTRADE. Since partner countries
tend to report different values for same trade flow, we generally use the mean of reported values
16We also find the results of this regression to be of interest for their own sake and discuss them further in Section
4. In addition, we perform an extensive robustness analysis in the Online Appendix to show our results are robust to
alternative choices regarding missing lags.
17We use manufacturing data both because of its wide coverage and completeness and also to maintain comparability
with similar studies.
18All first stage regressions make use of every single year of the data. Cheng & Wall (2005) have argued against
using consecutive years in gravity regressions on the basis that wider intervals allow more time for trade to adjust to
changes in trade costs. We have found similar results for the case of four year intervals. We favor using every year
because it gives us maximal degrees of freedom for identifying direction-specific FTA effects.
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when possible. If either country fails to report a value, we use the non-missing value.
An important feature of our dataset is that it includes values for “internal trade” flows (a.k.a.
“domestic sales”). To construct internal trade observations, we combine data on industry-level
gross output from two main sources: the CEPII TradeProd database and UNIDO IndStat. We have
selected both the sample of countries and the period of study in order to achieve the widest possible
use of the available production data from these sources. Since production values in TradeProd are
largely taken from earlier versions of UNIDO IndStat - and further augmented using the World
Bank “Trade, Production, and Protection” database by Nicita & Olarreaga (2007) - we generally
use TradeProd to provide production data for earlier years and data from UNIDO to fill in later
years where needed.19 We also cross-check against the World Bank data to fill in some additional
missing values from the beginning of the period. We then construct internal trade values as the
difference between the value of a country’s gross output and the value of its total exports to other
markets. In some isolated cases, however, it is not possible to calculate internal trade values
because the production data is either missing or implies a negative value for internal trade. We
address these issues in a series of steps. First, we apply linear interpolation between non-missing
values whenever possible. Second, if values are negative or missing only for a particular industry,
we apply the average share of expenditure spent on domestic output by that country on other
(non-missing) industries. Finally, we extrapolate any remaining missing production values at the
beginning or end of the sample using the evolution of that country’s industry-level exports.20
Free Trade Agreements. Our starting point for FTA data is the set of FTAs used in Baier &
Bergstrand (2007). We update and cross-check this data against information available via the
WTO’s website as well as the NSF-Kellogg Database on Economic Integration Agreements. Table
A.2 of the Data Appendix provides a complete summary of the agreements included in our study.
19Specifically, the TradeProd data is reported in the ISIC Rev. 2 industry classification, covering 1980 to 2006, and
the IndStat data reports values using the ISIC Rev. 3 classification, covering 1995 to 2009. Because ISIC Rev. 2
industry codes do not map one-to-one to the Rev. 3 industry codes, we construct country-specific concordances based
on matched years, using the 4 digit level of industry detail whenever possible. For these matched years, the correlation
between the original ISIC Rev. 2 production values and the (post-concordance) IndStat values is .990.
20We also experimented with using the U.S. GDP deflator as an alternate basis for extrapolating missing output,
following the procedure used in Anderson & Yotov (2016). This method makes virtually no difference for our results.
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Overall, our FTA data cover65 different agreements, including 8 multilateral trading blocs, 32
bilateral FTAs, and 25 agreements between multilateral blocs and outside partners.21 Within these
65 agreements, there are 455 different agreement-pairs, counting as separate any instance where
two countries that are already joined via a prior agreement become part of a second agreement (e.g.,
Canada and the U.S. in the case of NAFTA). Since we estimate two effects per agreement-pair, we
would ordinarily be able to estimate 2 · 455 = 910 distinct FTA effects in total. However, because
Iceland never exports to Romania before the signing of the EFTA-Romania FTA in 1993, we are
not able to obtain a directional estimate for EFTA-Romania on Iceland-Romania exports. We
therefore drop the Iceland-Romania pair from the latter two sets of estimates, leaving us with 454
pair-specific estimates and 908 direction-specific estimates to be used in the subsequent analysis.
3.2 Key Covariates for Second Stage Analysis
FTA Estimates. To construct the dependent variable for the second-stage analysis of the determi-
nants of the impact of FTAs, we combine the estimates of the current and lagged effects of FTAs.
The Online Appendix offers robustness experiments with alternative treatments of the lags.
Pre-FTA Trade Barriers. As originally observed by Baier & Bergstrand (2007), the main advan-
tage of using a panel specification with pair fixed effects to identify the effects of trade policies is
that the pair fixed effects effectively absorb all bilateral trade frictions in the cross-section. Impor-
tantly, this includes any “unobservable” component of trade costs, which otherwise would enter
the error term and potentially lead to inconsistent estimates. Therefore, the pair fixed effect γ−→
i j
in (8) contains potentially very useful information about the full level of ex ante trade barriers
between any potential FTA pair, including any unobservable trade costs. However, because γ−→
i j
is direction-specific, and because of collinearity between γ−→
i j
and the exporter and importer fixed
effects ηi,t and ψ j,t , we cannot directly interpret the values for γ−→i j we recover from the estimation
as reflecting “trade barriers” (i.e., the τ−θi j ’s). In principle, however, we can identify the average
trade level of ex ante trade barriers for trade between a given pair i, j by imposing symmetry on




’s. In practice, we can perform the following regression:
Xi j,t = exp
(















+ εi j,t, (10)
where the tilde superscript on the set of the partial FTA effects β̃1,A:d and β̃2,A:d reflects that fact
that we are constraining these to be the same as we estimated previously from (7) using directional
fixed effects. The γi j’s are similarly constrained to be symmetric within pairs.
The combined term “γi j + bt−1” then provides a measure of the average level of trade barriers
between i and j in the year before the signing of an FTA at time t. Since γi j + bt−1 is an inverse
measure of pre-FTA trade frictions between i and j, we expect that it should enter with a negative
sign in the second stage analysis. Because it is an “inclusive” measure of these frictions, it can
plausibly control for a variety of different obstacles to trade that could potentially be eliminated by
an FTA and would be difficult to capture otherwise, including idiosyncratic differences in domestic
regulations that inhibit trade (as emphasized in Baier & Bergstrand, 2007), the trade-muting effects
of uncertainty over future trade policies (c.f., Limão, 2016, Sec. 4.3), as well as each country’s
unilateral incentives to impose restrictive trade policies ex ante. Furthermore, since this measure
holistically controls for the full magnitude of ex ante trade barriers between a given pair of coun-
tries, we can then also include standard proxies for trade costs (ln DIST, COLONY, etc.) and these
will now in turn give us more specific inferences about the roles these variables play in explaining
the first stage partial effects (rather than also reflecting the role these variables play in determining
the magnitude of initial trade barriers). In our empirical analysis, we will simply refer (with some
abuse in terminology) to the combined term “γi j + bt−1” as our “first stage pair fixed effect”. Note
also that, in the year before an FTA, we have that τ−θi j,t−1 = e
γi j+bt−1 .
Revealed Market Power. Despite its inclusiveness, a key weakness of the pre-FTA trade barri-
ers index just-described is that it is strictly symmetric and does not allow us to speak to why we
should observe asymmetries in trade creation within agreements. One plausible theoretical reason
for asymmetries are through differences in each country’s terms of trade-related incentives for re-
stricting trade ex ante. We therefore also introduce a measure of each FTA country’s “terms of trade
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sensitivity” (or “revealed market power”), which we will use to examine whether asymmetries in
our estimated FTA effects can be rationalized based on terms-of-trade theory.
We derive this latter index as follows. First, we take a given set of FTA-signing countries in the
year before they entered the agreement (e.g., the U.S., Canada, and Mexico in 1993). We then use
a standard multi-country general equilibrium model (described further in Section 6) to simulate
the change in each country’s “terms of trade” as a result of a symmetric reduction in trade barriers
(i.e., a common “partial effect” β̄) applied to all trade flows within this set of countries. The index
we use for the change in a country’s terms of trade is




which, following Anderson & Yotov (2016), uses the ratio of the change in a country’s producer
price ŵ j to the change in its purchasing price P̂j (which also gives the change in its real wage).22
We repeat this process for every FTA in the sample, using the same common partial effect each
time (we use the overall average partial effect estimated from (5), β̄ = 0.293) and a (typical) trade
elasticity of θ = 4. This procedure will deliver T̂oT A: j’s corresponding to each country j in every
agreement A in our sample, which are directly comparable with one another and should not be
systematically related to the partial effects estimated from the first stage, other than for the reasons
we are investigating.23 Furthermore, similar to our (symmetric) “Pre-FTA Trade Barriers” index,
T̂oT A: j is also a relatively “inclusive” measure of terms of trade incentives in that it plausibly
reflects incentives to use other trade policies aside from tariffs.
The connection to theory follows from what the resulting T̂oT A: j indices reveal about the sensi-
tivity of a country’s terms of trade with respect to the trade barriers of its prospective FTA partners.
As elementary trade theory suggests, in the absence of a trade agreement, countries with more abil-
22Another, perhaps more-standard approach to computing terms of trade would be to focus on the ratio of export
prices to import prices. The main issue we encounter in trying to implement an analogous measure based on export
prices and import prices is that the latter approach requires that we first “artificially balance” global trade, so that the
results are not sensitive to the choice of numeraire. Aside from ease of computation, our preferred formulation of terms
of trade also has the advantage of retaining the intuition of the standard definition (see Anderson & Yotov, 2016, p.
282.) The Online Appendix adds further discussion and explores various alternative ways of assessing market power.
23That is to say, we can be assured the first stage estimates should not be mechanically picking up these general
equilibrium price changes because the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects explicitly control for them.
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ity to depress the producer prices of other countries with their trade policy decisions - i.e., more
“market power” - have stronger incentives to set high policy barriers to trade ex ante. Bagwell
& Staiger (1999) then show that, to achieve an “efficient” trade agreement, both countries must
fully internalize the externalities their trade policies impose on the other’s terms of trade, such
that countries with more market power will always make larger trade concessions in any efficient
agreement.24 Our T̂oT A: j measure captures this idea by revealing the differential responses of each
member’s terms of trade to a common reduction in trade barriers. For a country with relatively low
market power, the computed values of T̂oT A: j will be relatively high, since the increase in their
producer price ŵ j from a symmetric trade agreement will be large relative to changes in producer
prices in their prospective partners, which enter the T̂oT index through the change in the buyer
price index P̂j .25 For a high market power country, it is the opposite, since - for a reciprocal
agreement - its own price levels are relatively less affected. Thus, guided by theory, we expect the
FTA partial effects we estimate - the βA:d’s from the first stage - to be larger when the importing
country’s T̂oT A: j is low.26
Of course, the original theory of Bagwell & Staiger (1999) is a theory of multilateral tariff
negotiations via the WTO rather than a theory of FTAs per se. Since Bagwell & Staiger (1999)’s
seminal contribution, several subsequent frameworks help to clarify the applicability of terms-of-
trade theory to our setting with FTAs. First, even if we expect WTO members to have already
achieved their globally efficient trade policy levels, Bagwell & Staiger (2005) demonstrate that
countries which subsequently negotiate preferential FTAs still have a “bilateral opportunism” in-
centive to lower their trade policies further in order to distort world prices to their mutual advan-
tage. Second, Staiger & Sykes (2011) and Staiger (2012) have shown how terms-of-trade theory
24Because low market power countries do not make large trade concessions, some form of “side payment” may
be needed to make the efficient agreement feasible. Limão (2007) models these side considerations more formally as
cooperation on “non-trade objectives”. Hofmann et al. (2017) document that provisions reflecting non-trade objectives
have become increasingly commonplace in modern FTAs.
25Eicher & Henn (2011) explore a similar idea in the case of WTO partial effects. Bagwell & Staiger (2011) and
Ludema & Mayda (2013) also explore a similar idea in the case of WTO negotiated tariff reductions.
26We note that “market power” is not the same thing as “size”. In a many-country world with costly trade frictions,
a country’s influence on the terms of trade of others depends not only on size differences, but also on how the N ×N
system of general equilibrium relationships between all pairs of countries responds to a given change in trade policies,
which is captured by our theory-consistent T̂oT index.
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may be applied to non-tariff barriers when tariff policies are constrained by the WTO.27 Third,
Limão (2007) illustrates how FTA provisions on “non-trade objectives” (such as intellectual prop-
erty rights, security cooperation, and labor and environmental standards) create additional avenues
for low-market power countries to compensate high-market power countries for increased market
access that are not available though the WTO. Under any of these frameworks, the balance of trade
concessions within FTAs should flow from countries with more ability to manipulate the terms of
trade to countries with less, consistent with the hypothesis stated above.
New Goods Margin. For some specifications, we also follow Kehoe & Ruhl (2013) in accounting
for the possibility that country pairs that trade a smaller range of product varieties ex ante have
more potential for “explosive” trade growth ex post. The measure of the number of traded products
we use is the Hummels-Klenow decomposition of the “extensive margin” of trade (Hummels &
Klenow, 2005), using Kehoe & Ruhl (2013)’s (pair specific) “least traded goods” cutoff to deter-
mine whether to count a variety as traded or not. Specifically, the extensive margin of trade from i
to j at time t −1 (i.e., the year before an agreement) is constructed as
Ext. Margini j,t−1 =
∑
p∈Ωi j XW j,t−1∑
p∈ΩW j XW j,t−1
. (12)
XW j,t−1 is the volume of trade that each importer j receives from the world at time t − 1. Each
variety p in (12) is an 5 digit SITC product variety, obtained from COMTRADE and assembled
using the same procedures described above for aggregate trade. As in Kehoe & Ruhl (2013), p is
only assigned to the “traded goods set” Ωi j if, when varieties are sorted by trade volume, bilateral
trade volume in p lies above the 10th percentile. (12) thus gives us a flexible measure of the share
of products exported from i to j, weighted by each product’s contribution to j’s total imports.
27The theoretical ideas highlighted in Staiger & Sykes (2011) and Staiger (2012) are supported by Kee et al. (2009)’s
empirical finding that tariffs and non-tariff barriers tend to be policy substitutes for one another. Our own results
suggest asymmetries in market power are independently related to asymmetries in post-FTA trade creation even when
ex ante tariff levels are taken into account.
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4 Summarizing FTA estimates
Using the first stage econometric specifications presented in equations (5)-(8), we generate 4 dis-
tinct sets of FTA estimates. Each set of estimates consists of current and lagged FTA effects. For
expositional simplicity, the presentation in this section focuses on “total” FTA effects (i.e., the sum
of the corresponding current and lagged FTA estimates). Following Larch et al. (2017), all first
stage standard errors are “three-way” clustered by exporter, importer, and year.28
Average FTA estimate. We start by briefly discussing the average (across all agreements and
pairs) total FTA effect that we obtain based on (5). This specification corresponds to the standard
approach in the literature and is the easiest to describe: we estimate an average total FTA effect of
β = 0.293, with a standard error of 0.105 (p = 0.005). This estimate yields the interpretation that,
on average, FTAs have a partial effect of (e0.293 − 1) ∗ 100 = 34.0% on trade flows. Alternatively,
using a typical value for the trade elasticity of θ = 4 in combination with gravity theory, our average
estimate implies a (1− e− 0.2934 ) ∗100 = 7.1% average decline in bilateral trade frictions.29
Inferring lags for later agreements. As noted, we would like to extract as much information as
possible from our first stage estimates of later agreements while still acknowledging that “phasing-
in” is an important component of FTA-related trade growth. After first obtaining estimates of β1,A:d
and β1,A:d from (8), we subsequently estimate (using (9))
β2,A:d = 0.141+0.201 · β1,A:d +υA:d . (13)
With “robust” standard errors, both of the estimates in (13) are highly statistically significant
(p < 0.001 in both cases.) Importantly, in addition to allowing us to include later agreements
in our analysis, this method also generates results that contribute to the literature on the timing of
28Egger & Tarlea (2015) and Larch et al. (2017) discuss how three-way clustering leads to significantly more
conservative inferences of gravity estimates versus other standard approaches. For our purposes, an added advantage
of three-way clustering is that estimates become overall less precise when we examine increasingly disaggregated FTA
effects, as is seen in the accompanying figures in this section. We have found the same is not true when clustering by
country-pair, for example.
29The lagged term β2 = .199 (s.e. = .054) turns out to be both larger and more significant than the current term β1 =
0.093 (s.e. = .077), confirming the importance of allowing for phasing-in effects of FTAs. More detailed estimates,
shown in the Online Appendix, suggest that trade growth on average peaks 3-6 years after the signing of an agreement,
then falls off shortly thereafter.
20
FTA effects (c.f., Magee, 2008; Baier et al., 2014). In particular, our finding that π0 > 0 implies
that lagged effects of FTAs are more likely to be positive than their corresponding initial effects.
Likewise, π1 > 0 suggests that agreements with larger initial effects should also be expected to
have larger lagged effects.
Agreement-specific estimates. Our estimates of agreement-specific effects obtained by estimating
(6) are shown in Table 1, grouped by sign and significance and listed in descending order. As
an alternative means of conveying the heterogeneity in these effects, we also offer a graphical
depiction in Fig. 1, which presents the distribution of our estimates with their associated 95%
confidence bounds.30 Several features of these results stand out. First, not all the agreement-
specific effects that we estimate are positive and statistically significant. We find that 38.5% of
our estimates (25/65) are statistically insignificant at the p = 0.05 significance level, and 7.6% of
our point estimates (5/65) are negative and significant. Nonetheless, the fact that we find positive,
statistically significant partial effects for the majority (53.9%) of the agreements in our sample is
re-assuring given the more mixed results found in the prior literature. Kohl (2014), for example,
only obtains positive and significant effects for 27% of the agreements in his study. We attribute
the more “optimistic” findings from our analysis to the inclusion of internal trade values in our
estimation. As shown in Dai et al. (2014), internal trade is an important component of the overall
reference group for estimating theoretically consistent effects of trade policies; thus, estimations
that include internal trade generally obtain larger, more precisely estimated FTA effects.31
Second, we notice that some countries in our sample generally seem to have had consistently
larger (partial equilibrium) impacts from trade agreements. Central and Eastern European countries
in particular (e.g., Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland) are well-represented in the first column
30For later agreements, we impute the displayed standard errors by multiplying standard error we obtain for the
relevant initial effect (i.e., β1,A, β1,A:p , β1,A:d) by (1+ π1).
31Indeed, comparing our results with those of Kohl (2014) reveals that our estimates are larger and more significant
across the board, while otherwise mostly similar in relative magnitudes. In our own experiments, we have found that
the percentage of FTAs with positive and significant effects falls substantially when we drop internal trade observations
or if we estimate the first stage using OLS (with logged trade flows as the dependent variable) instead of PPML. The
ranking of the different effects from largest to smallest still closely resembles the one shown in Table 1 in each case.
We have also experimented with estimating these effects with vs. without lags and with different lag intervals. Again,
the ranking of effects remains very similar to Table 1 in all cases.
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of Table 1. We also note generally strong effects for agreements signed by Israel, Turkey, Mexico,
Mercosur, and the Andean Community. On the other hand, with the exception of Israel and Turkey,
other Mediterranean nations - such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco - have generally experienced
more modest effects. We will return to this issue of whether some countries consistently experience
larger FTA effects than others in our second stage analysis in Section 5.
Overall, the estimates from Table 1 and Fig. 1 confirm that FTAs have had very heterogeneous
effects on trade. The degree of heterogeneity we document echoes some earlier findings in the
literature, although we generally observe a more optimistic picture of the efficacy of FTAs on
an agreement-by-agreement basis. While these factual considerations are useful to note, there
remain three important avenues along which we would like to deepen the analysis. First, many
agreements involve three or more countries; thus, we wish to examine how the same agreement
will affect different pairs of member countries. Second, policymakers generally want to know how
trade policies will affect their countries specifically; thus, it is important to allow for direction-
specific FTA effects. Third, as noted in Baier et al. (2018), even the most finely-tuned appraisals
of past FTAs do not by themselves tell us anything about what the effects of future FTAs will look
like. These considerations motivate our more detailed pair- and direction-specific FTA estimates.
Pair-specific and direction-specific estimates. Given the number of estimates we can potentially
obtain from specifications (7) and (8) - 455 and 910, respectively - it is not practical to present
a full listing of the many pair- and direction-specific effects we estimate. Instead, we summarize
the heterogeneity we observe in our pair- and direction-specific estimates in two complementary
ways. First, in Table 2, we offer a snapshot of the substantial variation in partial effects that can
be observed within a single agreement, using the E.U. as our example. Second, in Fig. 2 and Fig.
3, we add graphical depictions of how the distribution of partial effects changes when we allow
for more specificity, i.e. for variation at the agreement-pair level and for directional effects at the
agreement-pair level, respectively. The distributions shown in Fig. 2 can be compared directly
with the distribution of agreement-specific effects shown in Fig. 1. The two plots shown in Fig.
3 then more specifically highlight, respectively, the degree of pair-wise heterogeneity within each
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agreement and the degree of asymmetry within each pair.
We focus on the E.U. in Table 2 because it is by far the largest agreement in our sample. There
are 98 distinct pair-specific effects -and 196 direction-specific effects - that can be estimated within
the E.U. alone. Rather than show all these estimates, Table 2 presents (roughly) the upper and lower
quartiles from the pair-specific effects, as well as some representative examples of asymmetries
within pairs. Both panels of Figure 3 also place these EU-specific estimates in the context of the
heterogeneity we observe within other agreements, such as NAFTA and the E.U.’s agreements with
Poland and Chile.
From the top panel of Table 2, we can clearly see a very wide variance in the effects of recent
E.U. accessions across different E.U. pairs. Consistent with our expectation that more finely-
grained estimates should exhibit relatively more noise, the ranking of the various estimates seems
somewhat more random than the ordering seen in Table 1. Smaller countries, such as Malta and
Cyprus, appear regularly at the extremes of both lists. Other, more economically large countries -
such as the U.K., Hungary, and Portugal - also appear multiple times on both lists.
The lower panel of Table 2 shows some representative examples of E.U. pairs with strongly
asymmetric E.U. pairs. For brevity, we only show these effects for three acceding countries
(Poland, Austria, and Sweden) and three existing E.U. members (Netherlands, Spain, and the
U.K.), though these examples are generally representative. Here, we do see strong, country-specific
patterns, confirming again the general pattern suggested by Table 1. Poland’s accession has led
more so to increases in exports from Poland to existing E.U. members than to increases in trade
in the other direction. This dynamic does not appear to be a regular function of E.U. accession,
however: asymmetries in the Spain-Austria and Netherlands-Austria pairs both favor trade flows
to the acceding country (in these cases, Austria) rather than the other way around. We also see a
similar pattern for Sweden, another acceding country, in its pairings with these countries. Overall,
these examples suggest that, even within agreements, there can be large, country-specific patterns
of effects that are worth investigating further.
The graphical depictions of the distributions of our various estimates from Fig. 2 and 3 echo
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these same messages and provide a broader overview.32 The wider confidence intervals seen in
each panel of Figure 2 confirm that, as we move to increasingly more detailed estimates, it becomes
increasingly more difficult to obtain statistical precision. Indeed, only 40.4% of our agreement-
pair-specific estimates (shown in the left panel of Figure 2) are positive and statistically significant,
with this same percentage narrowing to 32.0% for our direction-specific estimates (shown in the
right panel of Figure 2). Figure 3 then uses different colors to separate out these effects by the
different agreements they belong to. The left panel of Figure 3, which plots agreement-specific es-
timates against pair-specific estimates, confirms there is generally substantial heterogeneity within
the same agreement whenever multiple pairs are involved. Finally, the right panel of Figure 3,
which plots directional effects within the same pair against one another, then shows that asymme-
tries within pairs are also very prevalent, but - at the same time - directional FTA effects within the
same pair tend to be highly correlated with one another.
Admittedly, as we focus on increasingly specific estimates of changes in trade costs associated
with FTAs, we also increase the likelihood that our estimates reflect omitted factors that may enter
specifications (6)-(8) via the error term. Causal interpretation of these more specific FTA effects
would require that these effects are directly reflected in changes in trade that occur around the
time of the agreement. While this assumption may not strictly hold in all (or even most) cases,
presenting these results still allows for a broad description of the vast heterogeneity we observe
in the ex post partial effects of FTAs in our sample, especially within agreements. In addition,
while we acknowledge that individual FTA effects may be measured with unobservable error, taken
collectively, these effects can still be analyzed to determine what factors may be expected to be
associated with stronger or weaker effects ex ante. This is the focus of our second stage analysis.
32Baier et al. (2018) show similar figures using a random effects model, under the assumption that FTA effects
follow a two-tailed normal distribution. We are essentially showing, by estimating explicit dummies for FTA effects,
that they do indeed follow a two-tailed distribution.
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5 On the Determinants of the Effects of FTAs
In this section, we capitalize on the rich database of FTA estimates that we have constructed in
order to study their determinants. We start with a description of our econometric approach and a
general characterization of the heterogeneity we observe in our first stage FTA estimates. We then
launch into a “second stage” analysis, which takes the direction-agreement-specific partial effects
from our estimation of (8) as our dependent variable and regresses them on various covariates of
interest in order to gauge and decompose the determinants of these effects. As part of this analysis,
we introduce two new variables that prove to be important determinants of the effects of FTAs: (i)
our comprehensive index of “pre-FTA trade barriers”, which we hope to use to explain the overall
magnitude of FTA partial effects, and (ii) our index of “revealed market power”, which we will use
to investigate potential asymmetries in FTA effects as well as to test some prominent theoretical
predictions drawn from Bagwell & Staiger (1999). Importantly, our two stage design makes it
easy for us to test how these and other variables contribute to heterogeneous effects within the
same agreement and/or within the same pair. The insights that we obtain in this section will feed
into the out-of-sample and ex ante prediction analysis that will follow in Section 6.
5.1 Econometric Approach
Before turning to the full-blown second stage analysis, we pause to consider two preliminary mat-
ters of interest. First, because our first stage estimates of FTA partial effects have been potentially
estimated with unobservable error, it is important to discuss how this this error enters the second
stage and how our analysis may be structured to account for it. An exceptionally useful reference in
this regard is Lewis & Linzer (2005), who carefully examine the consequences of various different
ways of weighting a “second stage” dependent variable to account for residual error variance from
a prior stage. As Lewis & Linzer (2005) demonstrate, so long as a White (1980) correction for
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is used, simply using (unweighted) OLS to estimate the
second stage will enable us to obtain conservative, if inefficient, inferences of our second stage pa-
rameters. That is, while other weighting methods might lead to more efficient estimates, the White
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(1980) correction should still generate reliable consistent estimates of our second stage standard
errors and confidence intervals, such that we should not be worried about “over-confidence” in
our inferences. Lewis & Linzer (2005) also demonstrate that other popular weighting methods for
dealing with first stage error can actually perform far worse in terms of efficiency and generally
conclude that OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is “probably the best approach”
in most cases. With these recommendations in mind, we adhere strictly to OLS with robust stan-
dard errors for all of our main second stage regressions.33
Second, as a direct lead-in for the second stage, we perform a standard “analysis of variance”
exercise, sequentially adding agreement-specific followed by (symmetric) pair-agreement-specific
dummy variables as regressors in order to absorb all variance that is associated with heterogeneity
“across agreements” and (respectively) “across pairs within agreements”. The remaining variance,
that is not specific to either an agreement or a pair within agreement, then strictly reflects residual
asymmetries in estimated FTA effects within pairs of countries. The main results from this initial
decomposition exercise are as follows. First, the agreement-level dummies we use to absorb differ-
ences across agreements collectively only explain 35.5% of the overall variation in our estimated
directional FTA effects (measured by R2). When we parse the estimates further by next adding
pair-agreement-level dummies, the share of explained variation increases to 70.4%, suggesting that
70.4%−35.5% = 34.9% can be explained by heterogeneity across different pairs within the same
agreement. The remaining unexplained variation, 29.6%, specifically reflects asymmetries within
the same pair. Notably, this last term is of comparable magnitude to the other two components.
Usefully, this exercise also serves to preview some of the techniques we will use in the analysis
that follows to isolate how different variables may explain different aspects of the overall hetero-
geneity in our estimates. For example, regressing our FTA estimates on a set of observables in the
presence of agreement-level fixed effects will allow us to narrowly focus on potential sources of
“within agreement” heterogeneity. Similarly, the introduction of agreement-by-pair fixed effects
33In the Online Appendix, we also offer a more detailed treatment of the other weighting approaches considered
in Lewis & Linzer (2005). Auxiliary results using Lewis & Linzer (2005)’s other preferred alternative - an efficient
weighting method proposed by Hanushek (1974) - are very similar to our baseline results using OLS.
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will, much as in our initial decomposition exercise, allow us to narrow the focus further to sources
of “asymmetries within pairs”. Generally speaking, heterogeneity in FTA partial effects within
agreements is a topic which has not received much attention in the literature, despite its intuitive
appeal. The opportunity to selectively vary our focus in this way - made significantly easier by
approaching the problem in two stages - will thus be a key aspect of our overall methodology.
5.2 Decomposing the Sources of FTA Heterogeneity
The preceding discussion highlighted broad patterns of heterogeneity in our first stage FTA esti-
mates. In earlier sections, we have also described at length some attractive, theoretically-guided
indices for potentially accounting for some of this variance. The stage is set for a more detailed
investigation: What can we say about the empirical determinants of FTA effects? In short order, we
will introduce a wide variety of covariates that may hold sway in this context, including “economic
geography” variables, institutional factors, as well as neoclassical determinants of trade. For now,
however, we start with only a basic specification, drawing solely on a few key hypotheses:
βA:d = α0+α1ln First stage pair FEi j +α2 ln T̂oT A: j +α3Ext. Margini j,t−1+ νi j . (14)
As we have established in Section 3.2, each of the key variables in (14) has an intuitive expected
sign. The first stage pair fixed effect term, for example, provides a novel and comprehensive
(inverse) measure of the level of trade frictions between i and j just before the signing of their
agreement. Intuitively, country-pairs with a lower first stage pair fixed effect suffer from higher
ex ante bilateral trade frictions and, therefore, have more potential for larger trade creation effects
from FTAs ex post.34 We therefore expect the sign of α1 to be negative. ln T̂oT A: j , meanwhile,
measures the sensitivity of the importer’s terms of trade based on the simulation procedure de-
scribed in Section 3.2. A smaller ln T̂oT A: j indicates that the importing country has relatively
more influence over the terms of trade over its partners. Thus, we expect that α2 < 0, in accordance
with the influential arguments of Bagwell & Staiger (1999). We also expect that α3, the coefficient
34As discussed in the Data Section, the pair fixed effect term used in our second stage also incorporates our control
for the cumulative amount of non-FTA-related “globalization” that has taken place in the years leading up to the
signing of each agreement.
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on the ex ante extensive margin, to be < 0, incorporating the arguments of Kehoe & Ruhl (2013).
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the results from this simple specification testing each of the above
hypotheses. The first stage pair fixed effect and ln T̂oT A: j , enter with the expected sign and are
highly statistically significant (with p-values less than 0.01). Interestingly, the coefficient for our
extensive margin measure is significant and positive: conditional on our other covariates, countries
which trade a wider range of products with one another ex ante experience stronger trade creation
effects from FTAs ex post, contrary to the earlier findings by Kehoe & Ruhl (2013) and Kehoe
et al. (2015). We offer an explanation for this finding below, where we more specifically study the
heterogeneity in our FTA estimates that is due to asymmetries within pairs.
Column 2 adds several other, more standard variables that specifically draw on the “gravity”
literature. These include bilateral relationships - such as log distance, contiguity, the sharing of
a common language, or the presence of a prior free trade agreement - and also the GDPs and
GDP per capitas of each partner.35 For the most part, we do not impose strong priors on these
added variables. We do, however, generally expect log distance (“ln DIST”) to be negative, either
because more distant countries are more sensitive to changes in trade policies (as emphasized in
Baier et al., 2018) or perhaps because they simply sign weaker agreements due to weaker cultural
affinities.36 Likewise, countries that already have a prior trade agreement (“Prior Agreement”)
should experience weaker trade creation, because the earlier agreements have likely already picked
much of the “low hanging fruit” in terms of easily addressed barriers to trade.
The signs on ln DIST and Prior Agreement are indeed negative as expected. We also find larger
FTA effects for contiguous countries (“CONTIG”) and for countries with common legal system
(“LEGAL”). The positive and significant result we observe for CONTIG may be due to the same
35Aside from prior agreement, the added bilateral variables are from CEPII. GDP and GDP per capita are from the
Penn World Table.
36Baier et al. (2018) show that if geography, culture, and institutions influence the fixed cost of exporting, then the
trade cost elasticity - here, “θ” - will be heterogeneous in a Melitz-style model. For ease of exposition, the framework
we use to motivate our estimation does not explicitly accommodate heterogeneous trade elasticities. Nonetheless, even
if θ is not common to all countries, the combined term “τ−θ
i j,t−1” we extract from our first stage should at the very least
give us a reasonable approximation of the aggregate incidence of trade frictions on trade between i and j, since the
direct effect on trade of any given level of trade frictions τ is always channeled through the trade elasticity. Our Online
Appendix includes some additional experiments where we add to the second stage external estimates of country-level
trade elasticities from Broda et al. (2006).
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reasons we have already cited for the negative sign we observe on log distance. The positive and
significant sign for LEGAL, however, merits further discussion, as we would ordinarily expect
countries with dissimilar legal systems to have higher ex ante barriers to trade. The key remark
to make here is that, because we already have in place an “inclusive” measure of trade costs - in
the form of our first stage pair fixed effect - we may interpret these latter variables as affecting the
efficacy of the FTA independently of how they affect initial trade costs. Conditional on the level
of ex ante trade frictions, sharing a common legal system (for example) could conceivably make it
easier for countries to coordinate on stronger trade creation measures.
Three of the added country-level gravity variables—the log GDPs of both countries and the
log per capita GDP of the importer—also enter the analysis significantly. Interestingly, we find
that FTA effects are generally stronger for larger countries (measured in real GDP), both on the
export-side as well as on the import-side, with the exporter’s GDP having more overall influence.
While agreements between larger countries are associated with more trade, the combined impact is
less than proportionate; that is, a one percent increase in export and importer GDP increases trade
by less than one percent. The positive sign on the importer’s per capita GDP implies an asymmetry
in how FTAs affect trade between countries with differing levels of development, a result we will
query in more detail below.
Another important aspect of including a direct measure of country “size” in our analysis is that,
all else equal, we would expect size/GDP to be a reasonable proxy for a country’s market power
over world prices. However, while the magnitude of the coefficient for ln T̂oT A: j does weaken
when we add these controls, it remains robustly significant. Furthermore, the relative magnitudes
of the coefficients for GDPs are not consistent with a story based on market power: if anything,
they suggest FTAs promote trade from larger countries to smaller ones. We also note that, while
our estimate of the coefficient on the extensive margin variable is still positive and significant, its
magnitude falls by roughly half when these other controls are added.
Within-agreement heterogeneity. As noted above, a unique aspect of our two stage design is that
we can easily switch our focus from analyzing broad patterns of heterogeneity (as in Table 3) to the
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heterogeneity that occurs more narrowly within individual agreements and (later) within individual
trading pairs. In addition, this approach will enable us to test the robustness of our results in the
presence of a rich set of fixed effects. Column 3 of Table 3 repeats the same specification used in
column 2, only now with added agreement-level fixed effects, such that our estimates now reflect
only the residual variation that takes place within agreements. Most of our results carry over from
before, with a few notable exceptions. For example, Prior Agreement now becomes very close
to zero and statistically insignificant. Apparently, these limits are only relevant for determining
the overall impact of an agreement on all partners; conditional on a multilateral agreement being
signed (where at least one pair already has an agreement and one does not), we cannot identify an
effect. CONTIG likewise loses its significance. Interestingly, our earlier, surprising result for the
extensive margin also disappears when add agreement fixed effects.
Within-pair heterogeneity. To narrow the analysis even further, Column 4 of Table 3 moves from
including agreement-level fixed effects (as in column 3) to now including (symmetric) agreement-
by-pair fixed effects. Because these fixed effects absorb all symmetric bilateral variables (e.g., ln
DIST, etc.), there are only a few key variables that can be identified, and their estimates should be
interpreted carefully as strictly reflecting determinants of asymmetric FTA effects within pairs. For
example, once again, we obtain a negative and highly significant estimate on ln T̂oT A: j . Because
our agreement-pair fixed effects absorb the average level of trade liberalization within every pair of
FTA-signing countries, this result specifically indicates that asymmetries in trade barrier reductions
strongly favor the exports of the country with relatively less market power. This to us is the most
literal test of the “terms of trade” argument of Bagwell & Staiger (1999).
Turning to the other results in column 4, we once again confirm the exporter’s economic size
(i.e., its log real GDP) is relatively more important than that of the importer. However, we are
not able to confirm our finding from the previous specifications that asymmetries in FTA effects
favor the exports of the less developed country (in per capita GDP terms). In addition, we note
that the estimate on the extensive margin is now entering negatively, albeit with marginal statistical
significance (p < 0.10). While this is still not strong evidence in favor of the “least traded goods”
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hypothesis, the comparison across specifications helps clarify why our earlier results differ starkly
from Kehoe & Ruhl (2013) and Kehoe et al. (2015), since these studies each examine changes in
trade within individual FTA pairings on a case-by-case basis, which is most similar to our focus on
within-pair heterogeneity in column 4.
5.3 Robustness
Having established our main specifications in columns 1-4 of Table 3, we now move on to sev-
eral key sensitivity analyses encompassing some natural lines of inquiry as well as some deeper
concerns about causal interpretation. Our first task is to introduce more detailed information on
trade policies in place and/or the “depth” of the agreement being signed. To this end, columns 5
to 8 of Table 3 repeat the same specifications as before, only now adding the pre-FTA tariff level
(“ln 1+Applied Tariff”, which uses weighted-average applied tariffs taken from TRAINS), a 0/1
dummy variable for if the agreement entails the formation of a customs union and/or common
market, and two other, more specific measures of FTA depth (the “Count of Enforceable Provi-
sions” and the “Institutional Quality” of the agreement, which we take from Kohl et al., 2016).37
The inclusion of these trade policy variables at first appears meaningful. In particular, the es-
timate on the ex ante tariff level in column 5, where we are repeating the same specification as
column 1, is positive and highly significant as expected (p < .01). In addition, while the coeffi-
cient for Customs Union is basically zero, the other depth measures also enter positively, albeit
with marginal (p < .10) significance.38 Interestingly, the statistical significance of ln Applied tariff
disappears in the presence of gravity controls (column 6), agreement fixed effects (column 7), or
agreement-pair fixed effects (column 8). Our original main variables and controls, meanwhile,
remain largely unaffected. We conclude, based on these results, that our approach allows us to
37Note that, aside from the customs union dummy, each of these variables causes us to drop observations from our
main sample. The problems with availability of tariff data are of course well-known. Even though we use MFN tariffs
to infer missing applied tariff data whenever possible, there are still 54 observations in our sample for which we cannot
reasonably infer what the applied tariff would have been before the agreement. For the depth measures taken from
Kohl et al., 2016, we note that they also provide a third summary measure along these lines reflecting the total number
of provisions included in an agreement. For most agreements in our sample, the number of enforceable provisions is
the same as the number of provisions. We thus decided not to use this latter index.
38We are not the first to find that such “depth” indices are not robustly correlated with the amount of trade created
by FTAs. Indeed, these mixed results are in line with the findings from Kohl et al. (2016).
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capture important sources of variation in the ex post effects of FTAs that go beyond what we can
infer based on tariffs alone.39
Next, we consider two further sets of variables that may plausibly be linked to larger FTA
effects: (i) “institutional” factors (such as each country’s rule of law, the degree of democracy, etc.)
and (ii) the role of factor endowment differences and other “Neoclassically” motivated drivers of
trade creation. Columns 1-4 of Table 4 investigate the role played by institutions. The institutional
indicators we consider are: each country’s rule of law and bureaucracy quality (each from the
Institutional Country Risk Guide), their degree of democracy (from Polity IV), and the degree
of “checks and balances” in their respective political systems (from the World Bank’s Database of
Political Institutions). For some motivation, we are interested to know whether asymmetries in FTA
effects tend to favor the exports of countries with low levels of institutional development levels,
based on the supposition that FTAs may help developing countries circumvent constraints on their
export capacity imposed by their weak institutional environment (c.f., Anderson & Marcouiller,
2002; Manova, 2013). Additionally, the political science literature (c.f., Mansfield et al., 2007) has
argued that stronger checks and balances and/or a stronger degree of democracy should weaken
the ability of an executive to enact more sweeping trade policy changes.
The results of these experiments offer mixed support for the notion that FTAs specifically pro-
mote the exports of countries with weak institutions. When we look at broad results without any
agreement-level or agreement-pair fixed effects (columns 1 and 2 of Table 4), we generally find that
FTAs have stronger effects for countries with strong legal institutions (i.e., high “Rule of Law”)
and/or weak bureaucratic institutions (i.e., low “Bureaucracy Quality”). While there is indeed an
implied asymmetry potentially favoring exporters with weaker institutions in these initial speci-
fications, all of these variables lose their significance when we introduce agreement fixed effects
(in column 3) as well as when we add agreement-pair fixed effects (in column 4). For democracy
and checks and balances, we see a similar story: in columns 1 and 2, we overwhelmingly find that
39A possible reason why applied tariffs are no longer significant in column 5 is because they are highly correlated
with several of the controls we add in this column, including distance, exporter GDP, exporter and importer GDP per
capita, and (naturally) whether or not the two countries have a prior agreement. When we regress ln Applied tariff (as
the dependent variable) on these added controls, we obtain an R2 of 0.349.
32
these variables are positively associated with signing stronger agreements. However, they play no
role in explaining heterogeneity within agreements. Other key results remain unchanged.
Motivated by the Neoclassical “Heckscher-Ohlin” trade theory, the remaining columns of Table
4 control for factor endowment differences across countries (e.g., physical and human capital-to-
labor ratios, skill-to-labor ratios). We also include the absolute difference in these relative en-
dowments, as well as the absolute difference in (log) per capita GDPs, in order to get at various
potential dimensions of comparative advantage. Data for each of these endowment measures are
constructed using information from the Penn World Table. Echoing what we have seen in previous
results, while we do find some significant results of note - in particular for physical capital-ratios
and the difference therein - these results only appear to be meaningful for describing variations
in FTA effects across different agreements. When we examine these variables in the presence of
agreement fixed effects (column 7) or agreement-pair fixed effects (column 8), none are robustly
significant. Our main results still retain the same sign and significance.
Finally, as we have discussed, the identification of our second stage covariates requires that the
unobservable “noise” present in our first stage estimates can be treated as part of the second stage
error term. To devise a practical falsification test for this assumption, we utilize what we will call
the “first stage residual” from the years leading up to each agreement, defined as
ln residt0−m = ln(Xi j,t0−m/X̂i j,t0−m),
where “Xi j,t0−m” is the volume of trade sent from i to j in year t0−m before an agreement beginning
in year t0 and “X̂i j,t0−m” is its fitted value from (8). In principle, by including these residuals directly
in the second stage, as we do in Table 5, we can verify to what extent our first stage estimates are
picking up pre-existing changes in trade patterns as well as whether these pre-existing changes
affect the identification of our second stage estimates. In practice, since earlier work by Magee
(2008) has shown that a substantial portion of trade creation occurs in the 4 years leading up to an
FTA - an “anticipation effect” - we look to see if we can draw a reasonable line between where
we would expect to see only noise versus where we might expect to see anticipation when we add
33
these residuals to our second stage.
The estimates from Table 5 show that such a line clearly exists between the 3rd and 4th year
leading up to an FTA: when we include residuals from years t0−6 to t0−4 directly in our second
stage, we observe no statistical relationship with our first stage estimates across all of our key
specifications, whereas residuals from the two-to-three year period immediately preceding FTAs
tend to be significantly correlated. Importantly, all our earlier results maintain the same signs
and significance as in columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 3 and their magnitudes are only modestly
affected. Since we are now allowing actual changes in trade from just before an FTA to explain
our estimates, this last set of results confirms that our second stage coefficients are primarily being
identified by the trade growth that occurs after each FTA goes into effect.40
6 Out-of-sample Predictions & Ex Ante Analysis
In this section, we develop a simple, parsimonious prediction model for the effects of FTAs, using
candidate predictors drawn from the main empirical results above. We then apply our model to
the task of predicting the effects of a hypothetical U.S./E.U. FTA (“TTIP”) on the trade volumes
and welfare of each all potential TTIP members and non-members in our sample. Notably, we find
very large differences in predictions depending on whether we apply an average effect for TTIP
versus specific predictions for TTIP’s effects on all possible trade flows between members.
6.1 Developing a Prediction Model
Our out-of-sample analysis proceeds by dropping one agreement at a time and then trying to predict
its effects based on a model fitted using the other agreements in the sample. For our criteria,
we aimed for a set of predictors which: (i) performs well against other alternatives in terms of
40Another strategy, which we take up in our Online Appendix, is to treat the estimated standard errors of each
individual estimate from the first stage as reasonable indicators of this error and weight accordingly. However, we
prefer the above approach because it requires us to explicitly examine whether the movements in trade which identify
our second stage coefficients are specifically tied to the timing of the agreements. We have also experimented with
examining these residuals individually by year as well as with regressing these residuals (as our dependent variable) on
our second stage regressors. All results support the conclusion that the relationships we are identifying in the second
stage do not begin to emerge until the three-year period leading up to the FTA and that most of the identification comes
afterwards.
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R2; (ii) can be naturally motivated based on our empirical results from Section 5; (iii) contains
variables that were shown to be important for “within-agreement” and (if applicable) “within-pair”
heterogeneity. We also focus only on the 5th through 95th percentiles of our estimates.41
Based on these criteria, our preferred model is the following simple prediction specification:
β̃A:d = α̃0+ α̃1ln DISTi j + α̃2First stage pair FEi j + α̃3GDPi + α̃4GDP j + α̃7 ln T̂oT A: j + νi j . (15)
All the predictors used in (15) were shown to be consistently significant throughout the preced-
ing section, especially when we zeroed in on heterogeneity within agreements and (if applicable)
within pairs. FTA effects should be smaller for countries that have a higher first stage pair fixed
effect (indicating lower ex ante trade frictions) and/or are further apart geographically, and/or if
they already have an existing agreement in place. In addition, we also allow for asymmetries in
FTA effects within pairs by including the GDPs of both partners and our (inverse) measure of the
importing country’s market power, ln T̂oT A: j . Fig. 4 offers a visualization of the resulting predic-
tive fit. Each data point in Fig. 4 represents a predicted FTA effect (indexed by the horizontal axis),
which we compare with the actual estimate obtained from the first stage (indexed by the vertical
axis). The coefficient on our fitted regression line, ρ1 = 0.773, is positive and highly significant.
The constant from the fitted regression line, ρ0 = 0.091, is also positive and highly significant.
Before turning to TTIP, we acknowledge two limitations of this approach. First, the predictive
fit of our preferred model (R2 = 0.178) indicates that we are able to predict a significant but modest
amount of the overall heterogeneity in the effects of FTAs with our simple model. Obviously, if the
R2 were our sole criterion, we could easily inflate the fit of our predictive model by adding many
more variables on the righthand-side. However, this runs the risk of “overfitting” the model and,
furthermore, leads us away from being able to provide an intuitive understanding of what factors
are driving our predictions.42 A second caveat is that, because not all the directional FTA effects
41Models perform similarly in terms of out-of-sample predictions regardless of whether we include outliers. What
this buys us is, naturally, less likelihood of extreme values when we go to predict the effects of TTIP. The Online
Appendix provides details on the performance of various prediction models that we experimented with.
42An alternative approach would be to follow the second stage analysis more closely by running separate out-of-
sample predictions with agreement- and/or agreement-by-pair fixed effects to attempt to isolate each dimension of
interest. However, this would add considerable complexity to the analysis, whereas we would prefer to stick to a
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we computed in our first stage are positive, our methodology can and will predict negative partial
effects for at least some TTIP pairs. We do not take a stand on why we observe negative FTA
effects in our estimates. Our prior would ordinarily be that TTIP should generally lead to trade
creation between all pairs. Where negative values are encountered, we take this to mean that trade
creation is likely to be small. Despite these limitations, we believe that our approach is able to
shed light on some novel and meaningful sources of predictive power.
6.2 Predicting the Effects of TTIP
Our task in this section is to predict the effects of a U.S./E.U. FTA, given different assumptions
about how it will affect trade barriers between the U.S. and its prospective partners in the E.U. In
particular, we will explore two main scenarios. Under the “average” scenario, we base the change
in trade barriers for all U.S./E.U. pairs on our estimate of the overall average partial effect using (5).
In other words, τ̂−θi j = e
βavg = e0.293, for all U.S./E.U. pairs. Under our second, “heterogeneous”
scenario, we predict direction-pair-specific partial effects for TTIP using the insights from our
prior analysis. In particular, we let τ̂−θi j = e
βi j, where βi j is computed using both the coefficients
estimated from our preferred second stage model as well as the ρ’s shown in Fig. 4. In other words,
βi j = 0.091+0.773 · β̃TT IP:d, (16)
where β̃TT IP:d is the fitted value for each directional pair d within TTIP computed from our second
stage estimates. Essentially, we are using the predictive fit from our out-of-sample validation
analysis to determine how much weight we should place on our ability to predict heterogeneity
in partial effects (ρ1 = 0.773), versus using a common average component (ρ0 = 0.091). We use
this information in the interest of providing additional conservatism. The underlying regression
coefficients used to compute β̃TT IP:d are:
β̃TT IP:d = 2.909−0.311 · ln DISTi j −0.221 ·First stage pair FEi j
+0.145 · ln GDPi +0.114 · ln GDP j −10.861 · ln T̂oT A: j, (17)
relatively simple design.
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which are computed using all agreements in the sample, instead of excluding one at a time. All
estimates shown in (17) are statistically different from zero at the p < 0.01 significance level.
The predicted partial effects for TTIP are shown in Table 6, along with their standard errors.
Notably, they are highly heterogeneous. The overall mean—0.256 if weighted by trade, 0.302 if
not—is in the same ballpark as the overall average partial effect we estimated from the data (0.293).
Consistent with what we saw previously with E.U. accession effects, the largest partial effects, in
excess of 0.400 in each direction, involve the Eastern European E.U. members Bulgaria, Romania,
and Poland (with fellow Eastern European member Hungary not far behind). The smallest values
involve U.S. trade with both Ireland and Malta.
What explains the diversity in predictions across the various pairs? It cannot be variation in
bilateral distance, for instance, since all European countries are collectively separated from the
U.S. by the Atlantic. Actually, the major source of heterogeneity across pairs is the first stage
pair fixed effect, recovered from (10), representing ex ante trade frictions between the different
potential TTIP pairings. Ireland, for example, is already very tightly integrated with the U.S. in
trade: for Ireland-U.S. trade, we obtain an ex ante level of trade integration (i.e., iceberg frictions
raised to the minus θ) between the U.S. and Ireland of d−θ
US,IR
= 0.027. While this may not, on the
surface, seem like a large number, it is actually the largest of any U.S.-E.U. pair.43 The smallest
trade cost index (0.001) is for the U.S.’s trade with Cyprus, along with, unsurprisingly, its trade
with Bulgaria and Romania, followed closely by its trade with Poland (0.002).44
Turning to asymmetries, one might expect that, as the largest participant, the U.S. should have
more “market power” ex ante with respect to its potential E.U. partners. Actually, because the
E.U. countries are very tightly integrated with one another, their terms of trade are significantly
less sensitive to liberalizing with the U.S. than this logic would indicate. When we simulate the
agreement using a common average effect, the ln T̂oT A: j we obtain for the U.S. is 0.0036, whereas
43As has been observed by several authors—see, e.g., Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) and Head & Mayer
(2013)—bilateral trade costs are still surprisingly large in the present day, even for nominally well-integrated countries.
44For a useful comparison using simple trade data: in 2006, trade with the U.S. made up only 3.9% of Bulgaria’s
manufacturing exports and 2.9% of its imports. For Ireland, meanwhile, the U.S. took in fully 19.7% of its exports
and provided 11.6% of its imports.
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the mean value we obtain for this index for the E.U. countries (0.0023) is actually lower, indicating
a symmetric liberalization between the U.S. and E.U. actually tends to benefit the U.S. more than
the E.U. As such, we infer that an “efficient agreement” would involve the E.U. countries granting
relatively more concessions in this scenario. In addition, the fact that our coefficient on exporter
GDP is slightly larger than that of importer GDP would also tend to favor the exports of the U.S.,
since it is the larger country in each pair.
For our general equilibrium predictions, we will stick with the simple trade model implied by
(1) and (2). In particular, we will maintain that labor is the only factor of production and that trade
takes place in final goods only. As shown in Head & Mayer (2014), imposing market clearing on
a model of this type then delivers a standard general equilibrium system that generalizes across
a wide range of different models. While this simple framework omits several factors that have
been shown to be important for delivering larger gains from trade (e.g., multiple industries, trade
in intermediates, dynamic effects, etc.), it is widely accepted in the literature as a benchmark for
computing the general equilibrium effects of trade policies. Furthermore, it will allow us to capture
the basic point that, even when an agreement has the same partial effect on all trade flows, general
equilibrium outcomes can still be quite heterogeneous. The competitive equilibrium in such a
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j is the share of j’s total expenditure on goods produced in origin country
i. Note that we allow trade to be unbalanced. Total expenditure in j is therefore comprised of an
(endogenous) labor income term, w j L j , and an (exogenous) trade balance term D j . According to
(18), the total amount of output produced in origin i, wi Li, must be equal to the sum of expenditure
on goods produced in i across all destinations j.
Equation (18) can be solved (in changes) to predict general equilibrium effects of an FTA on
both welfare and trade as a result of an FTA. To see this, first let x̂ = x′/x denote the equilibrium
change in a variable from an initial level x to a new equilibrium level x′ (i.e., the now-standard “hat
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Given initial trade shares {πi j}, output levels {Yi}, expenditure levels {E j}, and a set of changes
in trade barrier levels, {τ̂−θi j }, one can solve the system defined by (19) and (20) for the resulting
changes in wages {ŵi}. With wages in hand, we then obtain the following expressions for the
associated general equilibrium changes in both welfare levels and trade flows:
GE Welfare Impact : Ŵi = Êi/P̂i (21)





· Ê j, (22)
where the change in national expenditure, Êi, is computed as (Yiŵi+Di)/Ei.45 We will use the year
2006, the last year in our data, to compute the initial trade levels and trade balances.46 Finally,
since (19) is non-linear in ŵi, we require an assumption regarding the trade elasticity, θ. Following
the recommendations of Simonovska & Waugh (2014), we assume θ = 4.
Table 7 lists the predicted general equilibrium effects of TTIP, both for trade and for welfare,
under the two noted scenarios. As is standard in this class of models, FTAs have a larger effect on
trade flows than they do welfare, as the implied welfare cost of substituting to one’s own suppliers
is usually relatively small.47 The U.S., for example, experiences a large change in trade volumes -
including a 7.32% increase in the value of its exports - but only a 0.38% increase in its welfare, as
45With balanced trade and/or multiplicative trade balances, welfare and real wages are one and the same: Ŵi =
ŵi/P̂i . Naturally, the computed changes in welfare and real wages are usually similar, although they may differ
noticeably for countries with large trade imbalances.
46The limiting factor here is data on gross output for later years, especially for the U.S. Alternatively, we could
use GDP to construct internal trade for a more recent year, as has been done in other studies. The theory calls for a
measure of gross sales, however (i.e., gross output, since GDP measures value added).
47This result is an artifact of assuming a single differentiated good with a trade elasticity of 4. If θ differs across
industries, changes in trade for goods with lower values of θ can have very large welfare effects, c.f. Ossa (2015).
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buyer prices in the U.S. (i.e., PUS) rise at more or less the same rate as U.S. wages.
Table 7 reveals several key insights we wish to focus on. First, even in the “average” scenario,
where all TTIP pairs enjoy a common partial effect, the general equilibrium implications of TTIP
introduce their own layer of heterogeneity. Usefully, this heterogeneity can largely be related back
to a key aspect of our analysis, the level of ex ante trade frictions between countries. For example,
the largest welfare effect is for Ireland, who enjoys a 1.35% increase in its welfare thanks to closer
trade ties with the U.S. Intuitively, since Ireland already has the lowest ex ante trade barriers with
the U.S., using a common partial effect for TTIP would eliminate a relatively larger portion of
Ireland’s remaining trade frictions with the U.S. than those of other E.U. members.48 Similarly,
the lowest welfare gainers under the average scenario include Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland,
and Romania—countries with which the U.S.’s ex ante trade relations are not as strong.
Of course, these same close relations between the U.S. and Ireland also led us to predict much
smaller partial effects under the “heterogeneous” scenario. In turn, the subsequent welfare effect
for Ireland is likewise predicted to be much smaller than that of the “average” scenario and is in-
distinguishable from zero based on the accompanying bootstrapped 95% confidence interval. The
case of Ireland thus illustrates the following simple, powerful conclusion: low ex ante trade fric-
tions are associated with both small partial effects ex post as well as larger welfare effects ex post.
Therefore, using a common average partial effect will tend to systematically overestimate welfare
gains for country-pairs who are already well-integrated in trade. A similar principle also applies
in reverse. The Eastern European E.U. members Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are
among those that see the largest improvements in welfare from introducing heterogeneous partial
effects, reflecting the large partial effects we predicted for these countries in Table 6. For non-TTIP
countries, general equilibrium effects are relatively similar across scenarios. As one would expect,
these countries all experience mild trade diversion and most experience small welfare losses. The
largest losers notably major regional trade partners on either side of the Atlantic not included in
the agreement, such as the EFTA countries Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland, the U.S.’s NAFTA
48This echoes an observation formalized by Baier et al. (2018): for the same (absolute) reduction in trade frictions,
countries who start out with already-close trade relations gain more in terms of welfare.
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partners Canada and Mexico, as as well as the United Kingdom (owing to its presumed “Brexit”
from the E.U.)
7 Conclusion
How do free trade agreements actually affect trade between member countries? And can we predict
the impact of future agreements on member and non-member countries? This paper introduces a
novel methodology intended to push forward our ability to answer each of these questions. Our
approach not only allows us to shed light on several useful, intuitive determinants of the partial
effects of FTAs, but also directly lends itself towards developing and validating an ex ante predic-
tion model for predicting the effects of future agreements. Several notable aspects of the analysis
include a novel set of theory-guided indices for predicting the magnitude of FTA partial effects, the
ability to consider a wide variety of other possible sources of heterogeneity, and the opportunity to
specifically examine determinants of heterogeneous partial effects within the same agreement.
Still, many relevant questions remain just beyond our current reach. For example, there re-
mains only so much we can say about which FTA provisions work in favor of creating trade versus
inhibiting trade. It is also widely acknowledged that economic integration agreements have con-
sequences for investment as well as trade. The consequences for investment, too, are likely very
heterogeneous across agreements and may interact with the trade-creating effects of FTAs in ways
we cannot capture in our current study. Furthermore, as shown in Anderson & Yotov (2016), FTAs
can have very different effects across industries and these industry-level differences in turn have
important consequences for quantifying the welfare impact of FTAs. Adapting our two stage proce-
dure to a similar industry-level perspective would be a natural extension of our methods. Including
trade in agricultural products and services would make for similar improvements, especially trade
in services, since services are an increasingly important component of both world trade and the
objectives of new trade agreements. As new data on trade in services as well as FDI are becoming
increasingly available, incorporating these various important elements will make for valuable new
avenues for future research.
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Figure 2: Distributions of Agreement-pair-specific (left) and Direction-specific (right) FTA Effects, with 95% CIs
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Figure 3: Pair-wise Heterogeneity within Agreements (left); Directional Heterogeneity within Pairs (right)
rho0: .091 (s.e.: .025)
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Figure 4: Out-of-sample Validation Results
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Tables
Table 1: Estimates of Agreement-Specific FTA Effects
Agreement βA s.e. Agreement βA s.e. Agreement βA s.e.
Positive effects: (cont’d) (cont’d)
Bulgaria-Turkey† 1.485 0.342 Israel-Mexico 0.553 0.136 Israel-Romania 0.174 0.195
EU-Romania† 1.463 0.142 EU-Turkey† 0.535 0.083 Pan Arab FTA 0.171 0.192
Romania-Turkey† 1.403 0.165 Canada-Costa Rica 0.492 0.189 EU-Egypt 0.149 0.125
Andean Community† 1.331 0.170 Canada-Israel† 0.481 0.091 Australia-Singapore 0.139 0.282
Israel-Turkey† 1.269 0.434 Egypt-Turkey 0.463 0.232 EU-Morocco 0.117 0.090
EU-Bulgaria† 1.248 0.225 Chile-China 0.462 0.167 Morocco-US 0.096 0.106
CEFTA† 1.240 0.242 Tunisia-Turkey 0.389 0.109 EU-Chile† 0.045 0.111
EU-Poland† 1.162 0.195 EU-Mexico 0.313 0.095 EU† -0.016 0.066
Costa Rica-Mexico 1.087 0.461 Chile-US 0.283 0.128 Mercosur-Bolivia 0.007 0.260
Mercosur† 1.024 0.205 EU-Tunisia 0.283 0.086 EFTA-Singapore -0.018 0.248
EU-Hungary† 0.996 0.170 Chile-South Korea 0.275 0.103 ASEAN† -0.107 0.145
Poland-Turkey† 0.976 0.152 EFTA-Mexico† -0.140 0.142
Bulgaria-Israel† 0.948 0.212 Insignificant effects (p > .05): EFTA-Israel† -0.213 0.129
EFTA-Hungary† 0.939 0.244 Jordan-US 0.954 0.684 Singapore-US -0.279 0.312
Hungary-Turkey† 0.932 0.132 Canada-Chile 0.851 0.447
EFTA-Poland† 0.921 0.193 Hungary-Israel 0.757 0.400 Negative effects:
EFTA-Romania† 0.890 0.230 Mexico-Uruguay 0.463 0.377 Australia-US† -0.170 0.064
Colombia-Mexico† 0.762 0.226 Chile-Costa Rica 0.419 0.313 EU-Cyprus† -0.194 0.096
EFTA-Bulgaria 0.740 0.353 EFTA-Morocco 0.384 0.234 EU-Israel† -0.256 0.080
Japan-Mexico† 0.701 0.115 Mercosur-Chile 0.353 0.244 Canada-US† -0.375 0.126
NAFTA† 0.662 0.152 EFTA-Turkey 0.299 0.154 Chile-Singapore† -1.099 0.174
Australia-Thailand† 0.623 0.093 EU-EFTA 0.294 0.184
Mercosur-Andean† 0.622 0.125 Chile-Mexico 0.266 0.486
Israel-Poland 0.566 0.202 Agadir Agreement 0.188 0.123
Summary statistics:
Simple Weighted Averages
Median βA estimate: 0..463 by inverse variance: 0.293
Mean βA estimate: 0.491 by number of country-pairs 0.382
Variance of estimates: 0.261 by (#pairs×inv. var): 0.200
This table reports estimates of the partial FTA effects for all agreements in our sample. Standard errors are “three-way”
clustered by exporter, importer, and year. † denotes estimates that are statistically different from the overall average
estimate of β = 0.293. There are 33 such estimates, or 50.8%. See text for further details.
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Table 2: Heterogeneity in EU Accession Effects
Pair βEU:p s.e. Pair βEU:p s.e. Pair βEU:p s.e.
Largest EU Accession Effects (by pair):
Hungary-Poland*† 2.186 0.487 Cyprus-Hungary* 0.503 0.251 Spain-Poland 0.412 0.228
Cyprus-Finland*† 1.711 0.399 BLX-Cyprus* 0.493 0.176 U.K.-Hungary 0.400 0.218
Hungary-Malta*† 1.600 0.571 Finland-Hungary 0.470 0.418 Austria-BLX* 0.394 0.086
Austria-Malta* 1.101 0.514 U.K.-Poland* 0.469 0.225 Austria-Spain* 0.375 0.191
Cyprus-Netherlands*† 0.716 0.135 Cyprus-Greece* 0.457 0.196 Italy-Poland* 0.370 0.168
Cyprus-U.K. 0.703 0.370 Cyprus-Germany* 0.456 0.153 BLX-Finland* 0.352 0.100
Cyprus-Italy* 0.555 0.139 Denmark-Hungary* 0.437 0.149 Austria-Poland* 0.352 0.105
France-Poland* 0.517 0.147 BLX-Sweden* 0.431 0.129 Germany-Poland* 0.334 0.110
Small and Negative EU Accession Effects (by pair):
Austria-Sweden† -0.202 0.107 Cyprus-Malta -0.307 0.371 Denmark-Finland*† -0.443 0.150
Germany-Malta† -0.205 0.112 Finland-Sweden*† -0.312 0.102 Cyprus-Denmark*† -0.455 0.213
Greece-Sweden† -0.210 0.255 Denmark-Malta† -0.327 0.193 Italy-Malta† -0.584 0.403
U.K.-Sweden† -0.213 0.143 Finland-U.K.*† -0.331 0.133 Finland-Portugal† -0.630 0.441
Germany-Sweden*† -0.220 0.107 Cyprus-Ireland*† -0.334 0.159 Portugal-Sweden*† -0.694 0.353
Finland-Italy† -0.256 0.136 Finland-Ireland*† -0.356 0.125 Ireland-Malta*† -1.069 0.232
Hungary-Ireland† -0.269 0.264 Italy-Sweden*† -0.360 0.087 Cyprus-Poland*† -1.220 0.247
Ireland-Sweden*† -0.291 0.144 BLX-Hungary† -0.399 0.210 Greece-Malta*† -1.819 0.308
Pair βEU:d s.e. Pair βEU:d s.e. Pair βEU:d s.e.
Examples of Asymmetric EU Accession Effects
(arrows indicate direction of trade):
Netherlands→Austria* 0.418 0.158 Spain→Austria*† 0.734 0.212 Poland→Austria* 0.575 0.186
Austria→Netherlands*† -0.486 0.162 Austria→Spain 0.110 0.187 Austria→Poland 0.157 0.152
Poland→Spain* 0.795 0.258 Poland→Sweden* 0.549 0.223 Poland→Netherlands 0.364 0.193
Spain→Poland 0.057 0.183 Sweden→Poland 0.040 0.156 Netherlands→Poland 0.157 0.158
Poland→U.K.*† 0.825 0.266 U.K.→Sweden 0.048 0.197 Sweden→Austria -0.105 0.224
U.K.→Poland 0.100 0.184 Sweden→U.K.*† -0.431 0.182 Austria→Sweden† -0.293 0.239
Netherlands→Sweden 0.317 0.199 Spain→Sweden 0.285 0.209 U.K.→Austria* 0.342 0.141
Sweden→Netherlands† -0.353 0.200 Sweden→Spain† -0.152 0.207 Austria→U.K. 0.197 0.147
Summary of within-EU estimates
Pairwise estimates (βEU:p) Directional estimates (βEU:d)
Mean: 0.047 Median: 0.046 s.d.: 0.514 Mean: 0.085 Median: 0.048 s.d.: 0574
# positive and significant: 27/98 (27.6%) # positive and significant: 37/196 (18.9%)
# negative and significant: 13/98 (13.3%) # negative and significant: 26/196 (13.3%)
# statistically different from β = 0.293: 41/98 (41.8%) # statistically different from β = 0.293: 82/196 (41.8%)
This table reports examples of pair-specific and asymmetric estimated partial effects for the EU accessions in our sample. *
denotes estimates that are statistically different from 0. † denotes estimates that are statistically different from the overall
average estimate of β = 0.293. See text for further details.
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Table 3: Second Stage Estimates: Baseline
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First stage pair FE† -0.195*** -0.372*** -0.261*** -0.154*** -0.346*** -0.246***
(0.034) (0.041) (0.057) (0.036) (0.041) (0.056)
ln T̂oT A:j -17.424*** -10.786*** -7.616** -9.423*** -19.392*** -13.557*** -5.881* -7.978**
(2.483) (2.995) (3.193) (3.284) (2.871) (3.120) (3.245) (3.241)
Extensive margin of trade 1.167*** 0.555** 0.349 -0.573* 0.932*** 0.402 0.249 -0.697**
(0.170) (0.263) (0.246) (0.303) (0.174) (0.268) (0.253) (0.334)
Count Enf. Provisions 0.484* 0.242
(0.256) (0.324)
Institutional Quality 0.493* 0.631*
(0.296) (0.328)
Customs Union 0.005 0.053
(0.087) (0.073)
ln 1+Applied Tariff 1.200** -0.228 -0.736 -1.008
(0.529) (0.572) (0.710) (0.647)
ln DIST -0.456*** -0.241*** -0.474*** -0.257***
(0.044) (0.081) (0.057) (0.085)
CONTIG 0.188** -0.003 0.144 -0.044
(0.093) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104)
COLONY 0.014 0.076 -0.050 0.120
(0.100) (0.111) (0.102) (0.115)
LANG 0.112 0.073 0.264*** 0.032
(0.082) (0.093) (0.091) (0.098)
LEGAL 0.161** 0.262*** 0.190** 0.248***
(0.075) (0.080) (0.076) (0.080)
Prior Agreement -0.262*** -0.000 -0.235*** 0.028
(0.055) (0.085) (0.072) (0.086)
Exporter (log) Real GDP 0.202*** 0.152*** 0.205*** 0.169***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040)
Importer (log) Real GDP 0.146*** 0.091*** -0.139*** 0.111*** 0.069** -0.182***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.043) (0.028) (0.030) (0.048)
Exporter (log) GDP per capita -0.067 0.002 -0.059 0.071
(0.083) (0.108) (0.099) (0.136)
Importer (log) GDP per capita 0.172*** 0.235*** 0.117 0.145** 0.271** 0.071
(0.048) (0.086) (0.079) (0.070) (0.116) (0.098)
Constant 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.363***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028)
Agreement FEs x x
Agr.×pair FEs x x
Observations 908 908 908 908 826 826 852 806
R2 0.078 0.261 0.424 0.729 0.099 0.270 0.427 0.740
Within R2 0.107 0.086 0.104 0.118
This table reports second stage OLS estimates with robust standard errors (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is βA:d, an
estimated direction-specific FTA partial effect which we have estimated in a prior stage. Observation counts vary in columns 5-8 versus
columns 1-4 because of the limited availability of tariff data (from TRAINS) and information on the number of enforceable provisions and
institutional quality for each FTA (from Kohl et al., 2016). In columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, all variables are de-meaned with respect to their
within-sample mean. This allows us to interpret the regression constant as reflecting the overall average FTA estimate after netting out the
average effects of each of the included covariates. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. † Also accounts for “globalization” effects. See
text for further details.
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Table 4: Second Stage Estimates: Institutions and Factor Endowments
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First stage pair FE† -0.160*** -0.296*** -0.263*** -0.156*** -0.257*** -0.233***
(0.038) (0.047) (0.072) (0.036) (0.042) (0.060)
ln T̂oT A:j -17.127*** -12.921*** -8.662*** -9.347*** -5.373** -5.988** -6.404** -7.939***
(3.175) (3.186) (3.297) (3.547) (2.530) (2.640) (2.974) (2.805)
Extensive margin of trade 1.383*** 0.725** 0.252 -0.362 1.103*** 0.268 0.301 -0.253
(0.182) (0.281) (0.274) (0.346) (0.185) (0.266) (0.282) (0.315)
Exporter Democracy 0.046*** 0.054*** 0.055
(0.015) (0.015) (0.035)
Importer Democracy 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.049 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.032) (0.019)
Exporter Bureaucracy Quality -0.459*** -0.261*** -0.023
(0.045) (0.056) (0.067)
Importer Bureaucracy Quality -0.268*** -0.170*** 0.060 0.074
(0.044) (0.062) (0.070) (0.064)
Exporter Checks and Balances 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.020
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Importer Checks and Balances 0.038** 0.016 0.001 -0.018
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Exporter Rule of Law 0.089*** 0.060** -0.019
(0.027) (0.029) (0.042)
Importer Rule of Law 0.191*** 0.139*** 0.058 0.066
(0.030) (0.029) (0.044) (0.040)
Exp. (log) Physical Capital / Labor ratio -0.461*** -0.260*** -0.082
(0.054) (0.088) (0.152)
Imp. (log) Physical Capital / Labor ratio -0.188*** -0.151 0.027 0.088
(0.050) (0.098) (0.140) (0.106)
Exp. (log) Human Capital / Labor ratio 0.423* 0.228 0.240
(0.235) (0.250) (0.282)
Imp. (log) Human Capital / Labor ratio 0.908*** 0.525** 0.547* 0.313
(0.241) (0.250) (0.308) (0.246)
|∆(log) Physical Capital / Labor ratio| 0.419*** 0.175** -0.205
(0.073) (0.075) (0.141)
|∆(log) Human Capital / Labor ratio| 0.424* 0.064 -0.188
(0.240) (0.244) (0.366)
|∆(log) GDP per capita| -0.429*** -0.125 0.334
(0.098) (0.100) (0.206)
Constant 0.351*** 0.325*** 0.321*** 0.415***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.044)
Gravity controls x x x x x x
Agreement FEs x x
Agr.×pair FEs x x
Observations 826 826 826 826 716 716 716 716
R2 0.268 0.349 0.472 0.733 0.332 0.416 0.502 0.774
Within R2 0.139 0.095 0.152 0.132
This table reports second stage OLS estimates with robust standard errors (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is βA:d, an
estimated direction-specific FTA partial effect which we have estimated in a prior stage. Observation counts vary due to the limited availability
of factor endowment information (from PWT 9.0) and data on country institutions (from ICRG). In columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, all variables are
de-meaned with respect to their within-sample mean. This allows us to interpret the regression constant as reflecting the overall average FTA
estimate after netting out the average effects of each of the included covariates. “Gravity variables” (suppressed for brevity) include ln DIST,
CONTIG, COLONY, LANG, LEGAL, Prior Agreement, GDPs, and per capita GDPs. Full results available on request. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 ,
*** p < .01. † Also accounts for “globalization” effects. See text for further details.
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Table 5: Second Stage Estimates: Anticipation Effects
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First stage pair FE † -0.350*** -0.280*** -0.289*** -0.224*** -0.221*** -0.234***
(0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.047) (0.044) (0.039)
ln T̂oT A:j -11.286*** -9.082*** -8.989*** -7.525** -5.769** -5.745** -9.586*** -6.894*** -6.940***
(2.983) (2.478) (2.471) (3.288) (2.680) (2.709) (3.387) (2.560) (2.609)
Extensive margin of trade 0.491** 0.347* 0.365* 0.248 0.152 0.179 -0.618** -0.460* -0.457*
(0.248) (0.208) (0.201) (0.242) (0.212) (0.214) (0.294) (0.247) (0.249)
ln DIST -0.451*** -0.316*** -0.317*** -0.246*** -0.250*** -0.248***
(0.044) (0.036) (0.036) (0.081) (0.080) (0.079)
CONTIG 0.191** 0.105 0.126* -0.046 -0.056 -0.033
(0.097) (0.074) (0.077) (0.105) (0.090) (0.090)
COLONY 0.021 -0.024 -0.028 0.102 0.154 0.161
(0.103) (0.085) (0.085) (0.111) (0.110) (0.108)
LANG 0.097 0.054 0.065 0.041 -0.053 -0.052
(0.085) (0.071) (0.071) (0.094) (0.088) (0.085)
LEGAL 0.147** 0.136** 0.131** 0.245*** 0.209*** 0.207***
(0.072) (0.061) (0.059) (0.079) (0.070) (0.069)
Prior Agreement -0.291*** -0.207*** -0.222*** 0.005 -0.008 -0.020
(0.060) (0.049) (0.052) (0.083) (0.072) (0.071)
Exporter (log) Real GDP 0.212*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.164*** 0.093*** 0.088***
(0.036) (0.027) (0.027) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032)
Importer (log) Real GDP 0.124*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.071** 0.055** 0.057** -0.172*** -0.086*** -0.087***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.043) (0.032) (0.032)
Exporter (log) GDP per capita -0.060 -0.025 -0.027 -0.030 0.033 0.037
(0.082) (0.059) (0.053) (0.106) (0.094) (0.090)
Importer (log) GDP per capita 0.193*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.214** 0.217*** 0.221*** 0.138* 0.102* 0.103*
(0.048) (0.036) (0.035) (0.086) (0.076) (0.074) (0.079) (0.060) (0.060)
ln residt0−6 -0.007 0.082 -0.007 0.077 -0.095 -0.023
(0.087) (0.066) (0.087) (0.069) (0.120) (0.114)
ln residt0−5 0.074 0.046 0.127 0.086 0.068 0.001
(0.164) (0.098) (0.161) (0.099) (0.203) (0.149)
ln residt0−4 0.024 -0.156 -0.017 -0.125 -0.019 0.010
(0.166) (0.126) (0.163) (0.124) (0.197) (0.151)
ln residt0−3 0.165** 0.227*** 0.147** 0.185** 0.103 0.095
(0.068) (0.073) (0.065) (0.073) (0.099) (0.131)
ln residt0−2 0.267*** 0.269*** 0.259*** 0.262*** 0.262** 0.263***
(0.082) (0.085) (0.082) (0.085) (0.104) (0.097)
ln residt0−1 0.654*** 0.642*** 0.584*** 0.577*** 0.656*** 0.658***
(0.103) (0.098) (0.108) (0.100) (0.118) (0.105)
Constant 0.355*** 0.356*** 0.356***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
Agreement FEs x x x
Agr.×pair FEs x x x
Observations 874 876 874 874 876 874 874 876 874
R2 0.262 0.508 0.515 0.433 0.606 0.612 0.742 0.824 0.824
Within R2 0.114 0.385 0.394 0.119 0.399 0.399
This table reports second stage OLS estimates with robust standard errors (in parentheses). “ln residt0−m” is defined as ln(Xi j,t0−m/X̂i j,t0−m),
where “Xi j,t0−m” is the volume of trade sent from i to j in the year t0−m leading up to an agreement which begins in year t0 and “X̂i j,t0−m” is its
fitted value from the first stage estimation. Observation counts vary because we do not observe these residuals for the earliest agreements in the
sample. In columns 1-3, all variables are de-meaned with respect to their within-sample mean. This allows us to interpret the regression constant
as reflecting the overall average FTA estimate after netting out the average effects of each of the included covariates. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 ,
*** p < .01. † Also accounts for “globalization” effects. See text for further details.
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Table 6: Predicting the Partial Effects of TTIP
Exporter Importer βTT IP:d Exporter Importer βTT IP:d
Predicted partial effects of TTIP (by TTIP pair)
United States Austria 0.319 ( 0.220, 0.417) Austria United States 0.219 ( 0.126, 0.313)
United States Belgium-Lux. 0.249 ( 0.147, 0.350) Belgium-Lux. United States 0.147 ( 0.055, 0.239)
United States Bulgaria 0.536 ( 0.428, 0.645) Bulgaria United States 0.397 ( 0.284, 0.510)
United States Cyprus 0.399 ( 0.277, 0.522) Cyprus United States 0.218 ( 0.088, 0.348)
United States Denmark 0.315 ( 0.216, 0.414) Denmark United States 0.207 ( 0.113, 0.300)
United States Finland 0.335 ( 0.235, 0.435) Finland United States 0.218 ( 0.123, 0.313)
United States France 0.346 ( 0.245, 0.448) France United States 0.290 ( 0.195, 0.386)
United States Germany 0.305 ( 0.201, 0.410) Germany United States 0.264 ( 0.165, 0.364)
United States Greece 0.467 ( 0.365, 0.569) Greece United States 0.352 ( 0.252, 0.452)
United States Hungary 0.399 ( 0.298, 0.501) Hungary United States 0.276 ( 0.178, 0.374)
United States Ireland 0.051 (-0.049, 0.152) Ireland United States 0.002 (-0.095, 0.100)
United States Italy 0.368 ( 0.266, 0.471) Italy United States 0.303 ( 0.206, 0.399)
United States Malta 0.104 (-0.027, 0.235) Malta United States -0.067 (-0.202, 0.069)
United States Netherlands 0.198 ( 0.099, 0.297) Netherlands United States 0.140 ( 0.048, 0.233)
United States Poland 0.587 ( 0.485, 0.689) Poland United States 0.488 ( 0.388, 0.588)
United States Portugal 0.456 ( 0.358, 0.554) Portugal United States 0.342 ( 0.248, 0.436)
United States Romania 0.539 ( 0.435, 0.642) Romania United States 0.421 ( 0.317, 0.525)
United States Spain 0.479 ( 0.379, 0.579) Spain United States 0.402 ( 0.308, 0.496)
United States Sweden 0.248 ( 0.148, 0.348) Sweden United States 0.153 ( 0.060, 0.245)
Summary statistics:
Simple Trade-weighted
Median βTT IP:d prediction: 0.310 Median βTT IP:d prediction: 0.264
Mean βTT IP:d prediction: 0.302 Mean βTT IP:d prediction: 0.256
Standard deviation: 0.149 Standard deviation: 0.103
This table reports the predicted partial TTIP effects, βTT IP:d , for all pairs of countries affected by TTIP. The United
Kingdom is not included in TTIP. Trade frictions between EU countries are assumed to not be affected. The numbers shown
in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. See text for further details.
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Table 7: General Equilibrium Predictions for the Effects of an E.U./U.S. FTA
Percentage changes in trade and welfare, by country
“Average” Scenario “Heterogeneous” Scenario
∆% Exports ∆% Imports ∆% Welfare ∆% Exports ∆% Imports ∆% Welfare
Austria 1.18 1.14 0.24 1.28 ( 0.93, 1.86) 1.23 ( 0.90, 1.79) 0.22 ( 0.17, 0.31)
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.58 1.59 0.20 1.19 ( 0.80, 1.88) 1.20 ( 0.81, 1.89) 0.12 ( 0.08, 0.20)
Bulgaria 0.81 0.59 0.06 1.71 ( 1.41, 2.33) 1.25 ( 1.03, 1.70) 0.14 ( 0.11, 0.20)
Canada -0.69 -0.67 -0.10 -0.81 ( -1.24, -0.52) -0.78 ( -1.20, -0.50) -0.10 ( -0.15, -0.07)
Cyprus 0.74 0.20 0.02 0.88 ( 0.69, 1.26) 0.24 ( 0.19, 0.35) -0.02 ( -0.08, 0.05)
Denmark 1.34 1.21 0.23 1.42 ( 1.04, 2.07) 1.28 ( 0.93, 1.86) 0.21 ( 0.17, 0.30)
Finland 1.34 1.60 0.20 1.48 ( 1.14, 2.11) 1.77 ( 1.36, 2.53) 0.21 ( 0.17, 0.29)
France 1.86 1.76 0.22 2.22 ( 1.69, 3.22) 2.10 ( 1.60, 3.04) 0.25 ( 0.19, 0.37)
Germany 1.90 2.59 0.36 1.98 ( 1.40, 3.03) 2.70 ( 1.90, 4.14) 0.37 ( 0.27, 0.57)
Greece 1.82 0.54 0.02 3.20 ( 2.64, 4.36) 0.96 ( 0.79, 1.30) 0.02 ( -0.02, 0.08)
Hungary 0.72 0.70 0.11 1.07 ( 0.81, 1.53) 1.05 ( 0.80, 1.50) 0.15 ( 0.13, 0.20)
Iceland -0.45 -0.17 -0.06 -0.15 ( -0.41, 0.07) -0.05 ( -0.15, 0.03) -0.07 ( -0.11, -0.04)
Ireland 2.62 4.54 1.35 0.26 ( -0.47, 1.28) 0.46 ( -0.81, 2.22) 0.13 ( -0.24, 0.65)
Israel -0.57 -0.63 -0.06 -0.65 ( -1.00, -0.42) -0.73 ( -1.11, -0.47) -0.07 ( -0.11, -0.05)
Italy 1.69 1.88 0.15 2.21 ( 1.71, 3.17) 2.44 ( 1.89, 3.51) 0.19 ( 0.15, 0.27)
Malta 2.06 1.23 0.29 0.26 ( -0.43, 1.19) 0.15 ( -0.26, 0.71) -0.09 ( -0.18, 0.03)
Mexico -0.75 -0.75 -0.11 -0.91 ( -1.41, -0.58) -0.90 ( -1.39, -0.58) -0.12 ( -0.18, -0.08)
Morocco -0.15 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 ( -0.21, 0.10) -0.03 ( -0.11, 0.05) -0.07 ( -0.10, -0.04)
Netherlands 1.58 1.60 0.54 1.02 ( 0.58, 1.70) 1.03 ( 0.59, 1.71) 0.29 ( 0.15, 0.52)
Norway -0.30 -0.18 -0.08 -0.18 ( -0.34, -0.07) -0.11 ( -0.21, -0.04) -0.08 ( -0.13, -0.05)
Poland 0.71 0.58 0.04 1.78 ( 1.47, 2.40) 1.44 ( 1.19, 1.94) 0.13 ( 0.11, 0.18)
Portugal 1.35 0.94 0.09 2.33 ( 1.93, 3.17) 1.63 ( 1.35, 2.22) 0.15 ( 0.13, 0.20)
Romania 0.91 0.56 0.04 1.93 ( 1.59, 2.62) 1.20 ( 0.99, 1.63) 0.10 ( 0.07, 0.15)
Spain 1.27 0.88 0.07 2.39 ( 1.98, 3.24) 1.64 ( 1.36, 2.23) 0.13 ( 0.10, 0.18)
Sweden 1.58 1.99 0.33 1.21 ( 0.77, 1.93) 1.52 ( 0.97, 2.43) 0.23 ( 0.15, 0.38)
Switzerland -0.31 -0.32 -0.05 -0.25 ( -0.40, -0.17) -0.26 ( -0.42, -0.18) -0.05 ( -0.07, -0.03)
Tunisia -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.05 ( -0.13, 0.22) 0.03 ( -0.09, 0.15) -0.08 ( -0.12, -0.05)
Turkey -0.11 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 ( -0.16, 0.16) 0.00 ( -0.11, 0.11) -0.03 ( -0.05, -0.02)
United Kingdom -0.28 -0.21 -0.05 -0.15 ( -0.31, -0.03) -0.12 ( -0.24, -0.02) -0.05 ( -0.08, -0.03)
United States 7.32 4.33 0.38 6.49 ( 4.63, 9.96) 3.84 ( 2.74, 5.89) 0.37 ( 0.27, 0.55)
Other Non-TTIP -0.23 -0.29 -0.02 -0.23 ( -0.34, -0.16) -0.29 ( -0.43, -0.20) -0.02 ( -0.03, -0.01)
EU 1.48 1.51 0.22 1.55 ( 1.09, 2.36) 1.58 ( 1.11, 2.40) 0.20 ( 0.13, 0.31)
TTIP 2.60 2.32 0.28 2.50 ( 1.77, 3.81) 2.23 ( 1.58, 3.41) 0.26 ( 0.19, 0.41)
Non-TTIP -0.30 -0.35 -0.03 -0.31 ( -0.48, -0.21) -0.36 ( -0.56, -0.24) -0.03 ( -0.05, -0.02)
World 1.28 1.28 0.14 1.22 ( 0.75, 1.98) 1.22 ( 0.75, 1.98) 0.13 ( 0.08, 0.21)
This table compares the results from a general equilibrium simulation of the effects of a hypothetical U.S./E.U. FTA (“TTIP”) under two
scenarios: (i) an “average” scenario, where all GE effects are predicted based off of a common average partial effect being applied equally to
all TTIP pairs, and (ii) a “heterogeneous” scenario where we use heterogeneous partial effects predicted by our out-of-sample prediction
model. For the latter set of results, we include bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. See text for further details.
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Data Appendix
Table A.1: Included Countries
Main sample (52 countries/regions): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Japan,
South Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, Mexico, Malta, Myanmar, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, United States
“Rest of World” (17 countries/regions): Cameroon, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Macau, Mauritius,
Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nepal, Panama, Senegal, Trinidad & Tobago, Tanzania, South Africa
Table A.2: Included Agreements
Multilateral Trade Blocs
Agreement Year Member Countries
ASEAN∗ 2000 Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
Agadir 2006 Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia
Andean Community† 1993 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador
CEFTA 1993 Poland (1993-2004), Hungary (1993-2004), Romania (1997-2004),
Bulgaria (1998-2004)
EFTA 1960 Norway, Switzerland, Iceland (1970), Portugal (1960-1986),
Austria (1960-1995), Sweden (1960-1995) Finland (1986-1995).
EU† 1958 Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark (1973),
Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986),
Spain (1986), Austria (1995), Finland (1995), Sweden (1995),
Cyprus (2004), Malta (2004), Hungary (2004), Poland (2004)
Mercosur∗† 1995 Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay
NAFTA 1994 Canada, Mexico, U.S.
Pan Arab Free Trade Area 1998 Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia
EFTA’s outside agreements: Turkey (1992), Bulgaria (1993), Hungary (1993), Israel (1993), Poland (1993), Romania (1993),
Mexico (2000), Morocco (2000), Singapore (2003)
EU’s outside agreements: EFTA (1973), Cyprus (1988), Hungary (1994), Poland (1994), Bulgaria (1995), Romania (1995),
Turkey (1996)†, Tunisia (1998), Israel (2000), Mexico (2000), Morocco (2000),Chile (2003), Egypt (2004)
Other agreements: Australia-Singapore (2003), Australia-Thailand (2005), Australia-U.S. (2005), Bulgaria-Israel (2002),
Bulgaria-Turkey (1998), Canada-Chile (1997), , Canada-Costa Rica (2003), Canada-Israel (1997), Canada-U.S. (1989),
Chile-China (2006), Chile-Costa Rica (2002), Chile-Mexico (1999), Chile-Singapore (2006), Chile-South Korea (2004),
Chile-U.S. (2004), Colombia-Mexico (1995), Costa Rica-Mexico (1995), Egypt-Turkey (2006), Hungary-Israel (1998),
Hungary-Turkey (1998), Israel-Mexico (2000), Israel-Poland (1998), Israel-Romania (2001), Israel-Turkey (2001),
Japan-Mexico (2005), Jordan-U.S. (2002), Mercosur-Andean (2005), Mercosur-Bolivia (1996), Mercosur-Chile (1996),
Mexico-Uruguay (2005), Morocco-U.S. (2006), Poland-Turkey (2000), Romania-Turkey (1998), Singapore-U.S. (2004),
Tunisia-Turkey (2006)
∗For these two blocs, we follow the NSF-Kellogg Database in using, respectively, the date at which ASEAN
“moved toward” becoming a free trade area and the date at which Mercosur became a customs union.
†Denotes a deeper level of agreement (e.g., a customs union).
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Supplementary Appendix. (Not for publication.)
The purpose of this Appendix is to supplement the analysis of Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin (2018)
with some additional documentation supporting our preferred methods as well as to provide an
extensive series of sensitivity checks. We begin by adding more details on the use of our “terms of
trade sensitivity” (TOT) indices as proxies for market power.
1. More details on TOT indices
In connection with the use of our “ln T̂oT A: j” indices as a key source of variation in the analysis,
we provide more details on how these indices vary across countries as well as how they correlate
with alternative external measures of “market power”. Table B.1 shows the average ln T̂oT A: j
values for each country, sorted from least to greatest. Noting that, by construction, ln T̂oT A: j is an
inverse measure of market power, the countries listed in the top-left would be expected to grant
the largest concessions when signing agreements, whereas countries at the bottom-right would be
likely to be already close to their optimal policies.
The estimates from Table B.1 reveal that while larger countries are generally ranked higher up
in the table than smaller countries, our TOT indices are clearly not just a function of market size.
The degree to which a country is “networked” with its FTA partners-to-be also appears to matters
here. The countries we infer as having the most market power are large Asian economies such as
China, Japan, and South Korea, each of which has pursued agreements with countries outside of
their local geographic areas (Chile in the case of China and South Korea, Mexico in the case of
Japan). We also see that EU members, even relatively small ones such as Belgium-Luxembourg,
are well-represented in the left and middle columns of Table B.1. As discussed in Section 6, this
is because tight trade networks within the EU make outside agreements relatively less welfare-
enhancing for individual EU members versus if they had each pursued bilateral agreements with
these outside countries. By the same token, relatively small European countries such as Hungary
or Malta, who had each depended much more heavily on the EU for trade than vice versa before
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signing their respective EU agreements, are associated with some of the largest TOT values that
we obtain.
To further examine the external validity of our TOT indices, Table B.2 shows raw correlations
between the ln T̂oT A: j’s and external estimates of export supply elasticities facing each importer
taken from Nicita et al. (2018) and Broda et al. (2008). More precisely, for the Nicita et al. (2018)
measure, we use the the simple average export supply elasticity reported in their Table 1. For the
Broda et al. (2008) measure, we create our own weighted average elasticities by combining their
HS4-level estimates with data on HS4 imports for the years 1994-2002. We also show correlations
between these measures and applied MFN tariffs, which are weighted-average MFN tariffs taken
from TRAINS. As the export supply elasticities and our ln T̂oT A: j indices are both inverse mea-
sures of market power, the positive correlation between these three variables is as expected. For
comparison’s sake, it is also interesting to note that our ln T̂oT A: j indices are more closely aligned
with these external estimates of market power than the importer’s MFN tariff, which actually enters
with the “wrong” sign in each case. The signs of these latter correlations likely reflect the WTO’s
successful efforts at getting high-market power countries to reduce their MFN tariffs.49
2. Out-of-sample validation procedure
As noted in Section 6, our preferred model for the out-of-sample prediction analysis involves
country GDPs, geographical distance, the “pair fixed effect” term from the first stage, and the
importer’s ln T̂oT A: j index. Here, we describe the procedure that we used to select this model:
1. As noted in Section 6.1, we start with a selection of variables that were shown to be sig-
nificant throughout our second stage analysis, especially when we zeroed in on heterogene-
ity within agreements and (if applicable) within pairs. The variables meeting this criteria
are: Exporter (log) GDP, Importer (log) GDP, ln DIST, LEGAL, First stage pair FE, and
49Note that the number of observations for most of the correlations shown in this table is only 655. The reason
for this is that the export supply elasticity estimates from Nicita et al. (2018) are not available for all countries in
our sample. For the estimates from Broda et al. (2008), only 9 countries in our data set overlap with theirs. The
correlations involving these latter estimates are based on only 17 observations.
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ln T̂oT A: j .
2. Following the procedure described in the text, we repeatedly estimate our second stage model
using this initial set of candidate variables after dropping one agreement at a time and then
record the out-of-sample predictions for the different pairs of country within the excluded
agreement. Noting that we first drop outliers, dropping and predicting each agreement in
this way then gives us a set of 817 out-of-sample predicted values we can compare with our
original first stage estimates. The fit between these predicted values and the original first
stage estimates is summarized as “Baseline” in the accompanying Table B.3. Specifically,
we compute a simple linear fit from the following regression:
βA:d = ρ0+ ρ1 · β̃A:d + e, (23)
where βA:d is the first stage estimate for a directional pair d within agreement A and β̃A:d
is the corresponding out-of-sample prediction. We use the R2 from this regression to judge
predictive fit.
3. Next, we experiment with dropping each of these regressors one at a time to examine how
the goodness of fit changes. As we can see in the case of sharing a common legal system
(“LEGAL”), the R2 of the predictive fit increases slightly when we do not include LEGAL
in the model. Thus, we conclude LEGAL does not have sufficient predictive power out-of-
sample to be included in our prediction model. The R2 does suffer, however, when any of
the other key variables are dropped, as can be seen from the other results in the Table B.3.
Based on this analysis, we concluded that the model described as “drop LEGAL” should be
our preferred model for predicting the effects of a hypothetical future agreement. We have
also verified that dropping variables in any other order using this procedure leads to the same
conclusion.
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3. Supplementary aggregate results
To supplement the “aggregate” results reported in the paper for an overall average treatment effect
of FTAs, in this section we document how these estimates vary under different specifications of
the timing of the FTA effects. The motivation for this analysis was twofold. First, we wanted to
confirm the representativeness of our sample and analysis in relation to existing studies that have
used lead and lag FTA dummies to assess the timing of FTA effects (c.f., Baier & Bergstrand,
2007; Anderson & Yotov, 2016.) Second, we used the analysis in this section to guide the main es-
timations with heterogeneous effects. Table B.4 presents the results from a series of specifications
with common lead and lag coefficients. Column 1 reproduces the average FTA estimate we would
have estimated without any lags or leads. Column 2 introduces 2 year lead and 2 and 4 year lags.
Then, column 3 uses 3 year lead and 3 and 6 year lags, and so forth, until we reach to column 6,
which has 6 year lead and 6 and 12 year lags.
Several findings stand out from these supplementary estimates: (i) None of the leads are sta-
tistically or economically significant. (ii) We see that when we move further and further away
from the year in which the agreement entered into force, the estimates of the leads decrease mono-
tonically and move from positive to negative. (iii) As expected, the estimates of the lags reveal
phasing-in effects. (iv) Also as expected, we do see that the phasing-in is non-monotonic. After
entering into force, the agreements have stronger effects, then they fade away; (v) The majority
of the trade impact of FTAs seems to occur within the first 5-6 years. (vi) Finally, consistent with
our expectations, we found that the longer the second lags, the weaker were their estimates both in
terms of magnitude and significance. We conclude based on this analysis that using a single 5 year
lag in the first stage provides a reasonable approximation of the overall timing of effects. Later in
this Appendix, we also document that our main results in the second stage are robust to the choice
of lag intervals in the first stage.
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4. Additional sensitivity experiments
To supplement the results reported in the paper, in this section we explore some additional exercises
demonstrating the robustness of our findings to alternative choices we could have made at various
points in the analysis. Our three main focuses here are different ways to incorporate lagged effects
of our first stage estimates, different ways of computing our ln T̂oT A: j indices, and different ways
of weighting our first stage estimates to account for the fact they are measured with error. We also
show some additional results for when we include estimated demand elasticities from Broda et al.
(2006) as an additional explanatory variable in the second stage.
Varying the first stage treatment of lags. Tables B.5 and B.6 show second stage results based
on various alternative methods for how to incorporate lagged effects of FTAs into the analysis
(including one alternative where we ignore lagged effects altogether):
• Drop later agreements. First, we examine what happens when, instead of imputing lagged
effects for later agreements based on their estimated initial effects, we simply drop these
agreements from the second stage. As we can see in columns 1-4 of Table B.5 - which
correspond to the specifications used columns 1-4 of Table 3 in the main text - the main effect
of dropping later agreements in this way is to significantly reduce the number of estimates we
can work with in the second stage, from 908 to 560. Nonetheless, despite losing more than
a third of our sample in the second stage, the results are broadly robust. The only (minor)
differences relative to the corresponding results in Table 3 are: (i) ln DIST becomes only
marginally significant when we examine variation within agreements (column 3); (ii) the
importer’s GDP term and our extensive margin measure change significance slightly when
we examine variation within pairs (column 4).
• Ignore lags. Next, another way of dealing with the issue of not being able to estimate lags
for later agreements might to be to ignore lags altogether in the first stage. Accordingly,
columns 5-8 of Table B.5 show what second stage results look like using an alternative first
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stage where, in place of (8), we instead estimate
Xi j,t = exp
(











where we are now implicitly assuming that the effects of an agreement on trade should occur
all at once and that, for each directional pair, this effect is given by a single parameter “βA:d”.
We then re-produce our second stage analysis using these alternative βA:d’s, for which we
do not need to impute any lags. As can be seen from columns 5-8 of Table B.5, our second
stage results still remain similar even if we ignore lags in the first stage in this way.
• Use different lags. Finally, Table B.6 displays three further sets of alternative results based
on if we had used 3, 4, or 6 year lags in estimating our first stage instead of 5 year lags. Each
set of three results corresponds to columns 2-4 of Table 3 in the main text.50 The results
are highly stable across these alternatives and consistent with those shown in the paper for 5
year lags.
Along with our analysis of how the aggregate results vary with different lags (in Table B.4), the
additional experiments with alternative lags that we presented here give us confidence that the
approach we have taken in the paper gives us a reasonable picture of the timing of FTA effects. In
further experiments, omitted for brevity, we have also found all other second stage results reported
in the paper are robust to these alternative choices over how to allow for lagged effects.
Different ways of computing TOT indices and/or assessing market power. In this set of exper-
iments, we demonstrate the robustness of our results to several reasonable alternatives for comput-
ing our “terms of trade sensitivity” indices and/or assessing market power by other means:
• Restrict ln T̂oT A: j to always be the same within customs unions. As can be seen from Table
A.2 of our Data Appendix, a significant number of the agreements in our sample involve
the members of a customs union collectively signing an FTA with an outside country (or the
50That is, we skip results from column 1 of of Table 3 without added gravity controls (though these can be shown
to be similar as well).
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addition of a new member to a customs union, as is the case with the EU accessions in our
sample). As such, a reasonable alternative to how we construct our TOT indices would be
to restrict them to be the same for existing members of a customs union. We perform this
experiment the first four columns of Table B.7, where we use a new version of our TOT index
- “ln T̂oT
CU
A: j - which always takes a common value for the existing members of a customs
union. Specifically, whenever j belongs to a customs union, we use a weighted average
of the underlying ln T̂oT A: j’s for each member of the customs union, using each country’s
share of world manufacturing expenditure as weights. As columns 1-4 of Table B.7 show,
the results from this experiment are exactly in line with those reported in the paper.
• Use the bilateral difference in terms of trade sensitivity. Our decision to use only the im-
porter’s terms of trade index follows from our interpretation of the theory, which suggests
that importers with more market power all else equal should have higher trade barriers ex
ante. However, it is fair to also point out that our preferred second stage specification also
includes an “inclusive” measure of the average level of trade barriers within any given pair
(i.e., our “First stage pair FE” variable), which could plausibly capture the average level of
policy barriers. Therefore, another reasonable alternative for implementing our ln T̂oT A: j
indices would be to instead take the bilateral difference between the ln T̂oT A: j’s of the two
countries. That is, we define
∆ ln T̂oT A:i j = ln T̂oT A:i − ln T̂oT A: j
as the bilateral difference in terms of trade sensitivity and examine whether this term specif-
ically predicts asymmetries in trade creation within pairs across each of our prior second
stage specifications. As can be seen from columns 5-8 of Table B.7, taking this alternative
perspective again leads to our results being as expected: the sign on ∆ ln T̂oT A:i j is positive
and significant across each of our prior second stage specifications, confirming again that
asymmetries in FTA effects consistently reflect relatively larger trade creation flowing from
countries with high terms of trade sensitivity to countries with low terms of trade sensitiv-
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ity.51
• Use the ratio of export prices to import prices. Another reasonable criticism of how we con-
struct “terms of trade” in the paper is that it involves the ratio of producer prices to consumer
prices, following the formulation used in Anderson & Yotov (2016). However, readers more
familiar with traditional presentations of the theory may be more used to thinking of “terms
of trade” as a ratio of export prices to import prices. Following the argumentation of Ander-
son & Yotov (2016), we maintain this ratio represents the relevant concept to focus on in a
multi-country gravity context (especially in a world with unbalanced trade).52 Nonetheless,
drawing on the derivations Caliendo & Parro (2015) include in their Appendix, it is possible












which can be calculated using the exact same simulation procedure as our original index,
only now multiplying the change in j’s wage by its total exports E X j and also approximating
a CES index for the change in import prices (as opposed to using the change in buyer prices
more generally, which would also include domestic producer prices and changes in trade
costs). However, an interesting issue that arises with this index is that it is sensitive to the
choice of numeraire when trade is not balanced.53 Therefore, before computing ln T̂oT
alt
A: j ,
we first replicate Dekle et al. (2007)’s famous exercise of solving for a counterfactual world
51Indeed, if one carefully examines column 8 of Table B.7, it is apparent that the coefficient on∆ ln T̂oT A:i j is exactly
−2 times the corresponding estimate shown in column 4 of our original Table 3. The reason for this is because both
specifications include agreement-by-pair fixed effects, such that identification can only be obtained off of asymmetries
in ln T̂oT A:j in either case.
52More to the point, the main consideration here is that the notion of “terms of trade” we rely on should satisfy the
condition stated in equation (3) of Bagwell & Staiger (1999) (p. 220). Specifically, a country’s terms of trade and
welfare should be positively related (after all, it is the welfare inefficiency generated by the terms of trade externality
that ultimately matters in the theory.) Using the ratio of producer prices to buyer prices is a straightforward way of
satisfying this consideration, is easy to compute in a multi-country setting, and does not require trade to be balanced.
53To see this, note that in a world with unbalanced trade, j’s total imports
∑
i,j Xi j will not be equal to its total
exports E Xj . Any uniform increase in wages across all countries would therefore raise the terms of trade of any net
exporter country and lower the terms of trade of any net importer country. Our preferred index does not depend on
choice of numeraire when solving the model.
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with balanced trade.54 Using this “balanced trade” world as the new baseline, we then pro-
ceed to simulate a common partial effect for each agreement (as in the text), only now taking
ln T̂oT
alt
A: j as our notion of “terms of trade sensitivity”.
The results from this alternative formulation of our TOT index are shown in the first 4
columns of B.8, which again correspond to our baseline results from Table 3. The most
obvious difference of note from our prior results is that the magnitudes of the coefficients
computed for ln T̂oT
alt
A: j are much larger than those found using our preferred approach. This
is mainly a matter of scaling differences across the two indices; our original index ln T̂oT A: j
is more sensitive to changes in trade costs than ln T̂oT
alt
A: j . We do note ln T̂oT
alt
A: j becomes
statistically insignificant when agreement fixed effects are used (in column 3). However,
our results for other specifications are qualitatively no different from before, including in
column 4 where we narrow the focus to asymmetries within pairs by using agreement-pair
fixed effects.
• Use import shares. Finally, one other alternative way of assessing “market power” in this
context would be to simply use each country’s share of world import demand. As columns
5-8 of B.8 show, our results for import shares enter positively and significantly as expected
across each of our main specifications.
As with our experiments involving lags, we have verified that all second stage results reported in
the paper are robust to these alternative choices.
Heterogeneous trade elasticities. Since the general framework we used to motivate some of our
key variables relied on the typical assumption of a constant trade elasticity, we wanted to exam-
ine the robustness our second stage results to introducing external estimates of country-specific
trade elasticities. Specifically, we obtained country-specific import demand elasticities at the HS3
level from Broda et al. (2006). We then constructed country-specific aggregate import demand
54That is to say, we start from a world where a set of exogenous transfers {Dj} satisfying
∑
j Dj = 0 allows us to
rationalize observed imbalances between output Yj and expenditure Ej as Ej = Yj +Dj . We then solve for a counter-
factual world with all Dj’s set equal to zero, using the same equilibrium conditions described in Section 6.2.
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elasticities by weighting these HS3-level elasticities by the weight of each HS3 industry in a coun-
try’s overall manufacturing imports over the years 1994-2002. For countries in our main sample
for which Broda et al. (2006) do not explicitly provide elasticity estimates, we first constructed
“world-level” elasticities at the HS3 level using the share of each HS3 industry in world trade. We
then combined these world-level elasticities with our country-specific import shares to construct
aggregate elasticities for the remaining countries. Specifically, Broda et al. (2006) provide esti-
mates of the elasticity of substitution between foreign varieties within the same industry. Taking
the elasticity parameters estimated by Broda et al. (2006) to be “σ”, the trade elasticity we use in
our analysis can be expressed as θ = σ−1. Because Broda et al. (2006)’s estimated elasticities fea-
ture some extreme values (ranging from a minimum of 1.06 to values well over 1,000), we first take
the precaution of bounding these estimates to be between 2 and 15 before constructing aggregate
elasticities. The end result is very similar even if we do not take this precaution, however.
Table B.9 shows the effects of adding country-specific import demand elasticities to our second
stage. To set the stage, what we might expect to observe here is that importers with higher import
demand elasticities should be associated with a larger increase in trade following the signing of
an FTA; thus, we would expect these country-specific elasticities should be positively related to
our first stage FTA estimates. This is indeed what we observe in column 1 of Table B.9, where
we include the elasticity estimates alongside our initial specification with only key covariates.
However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of standard gravity controls in column 2, where
the estimate of the coefficient on the import demand elasticity is not longer statistically significant.
We also observe that the new elasticity variable actually becomes negative and significant when
we include agreement fixed effects (in column 3) as well as when we include agreement-pair fixed
effects (in column 4). Importantly, we note that our prior results from Table 3 are robust to the
introduction of the elasticity estimates.
Different weighting methods. We finish our robustness analysis by documenting what happens
when we vary the weighting method used to compute our second stage estimates. Following the
recommendations of Lewis & Linzer (2005), in the main text, we considered only (unweighted)
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estimates using OLS and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (using the standard error correc-
tion of White, 1980). Here, for completeness, we consider the two other alternatives for weighting
the first stage, which also were examined in Lewis & Linzer (2005): (i) a standard WLS (“Weighted
Least Squares”) estimator - which weights each observation by the inverse of the first stage stan-
dard error - and (ii) a special FGLS (“Feasible Generalized Least Squares”) estimator proposed by
Hanushek (1974) for problems of this type.
For concreteness, we will refer to the (lack of) weighting method associated with OLS as “W1”.
A second, widely used weighting method for two stage estimation is the standard WLS estimator,
or “W2”:




where σI,A:d is the standard error associated with each βA:d estimated in the first stage. W2 has the
desirable property that more precisely estimated βA:d’s from the first stage are given more weight
in determining second stage estimates. Unfortunately, this weighting method has the drawback
of assuming all model uncertainty in the second stage is due to the error associated with βA:d .
Accordingly, a third alternative, first suggested by Hanushek (1974), is






where σ̂2I I is an unbiased estimate of the the second stage error variance, assuming homoskedastic
errors. Weighting using W3 is an example of a “Feasible Generalized Least Squares” estimator,
which we will abbreviate as “FGLS”. Intuitively, FGLS varies the degree of weighting depending
on the relative magnitudes of the (individual) first stage error variances vs. the (total) second stage
error variance; it therefore nests both WLS and OLS as extreme cases.
As we see from columns 1-4 of Tables B.10, our FGLS estimates are a close match for our
original OLS estimates, implying that - exactly as Lewis & Linzer (2005) would caution with
regards to WLS - the degree of second stage error is large relative to the standard errors we estimate
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in the first stage. Indeed, the WLS results we compute using W2 (which we include for instructive
reasons only) are significantly less similar to our original results using OLS. For completeness,
we also show “analysis of variance” results for each of these three weighting methods, focusing
on how much variation in our first stage directional estimates represents heterogeneity that we
observe across agreements versus within agreements (and within pairs). As Table B.11 shows, all
three weighting methods suggest very similar decompositions in this regard.
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Table B.1: Comparison of TOT indices across countries
Country ln T̂oT A: j Country ln T̂oT A: j Country ln T̂oT A: j
China 0.0001 Germany 0.0007 Egypt 0.0072
Japan 0.0001 Colombia 0.0009 Singapore 0.0080
South Korea 0.0001 Jordan 0.0009 Finland 0.0088
Iceland 0.0002 United States 0.0010 Cyprus 0.0091
Spain 0.0002 Argentina 0.0012 Morocco 0.0098
Switzerland 0.0002 Denmark 0.0012 Bulgaria 0.0104
France 0.0002 Ecuador 0.0014 Poland 0.0113
Portugal 0.0002 Australia 0.0020 Tunisia 0.0122
Norway 0.0003 Myanmar 0.0027 Austria 0.0122
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.0003 Uruguay 0.0037 Sweden 0.0126
United Kingdom 0.0003 Mexico 0.0040 Canada 0.0137
Qatar 0.0003 Indonesia 0.0041 Hungary 0.0155
Ireland 0.0003 Chile 0.0042 Malaysia 0.0184
Italy 0.0003 Turkey 0.0049 Malta 0.0242
Greece 0.0003 Bolivia 0.0053
Brazil 0.0003 Romania 0.0057
Kuwait 0.0004 Philippines 0.0063
Costa Rica 0.0005 Israel 0.0065
Netherlands 0.0005 Thailand 0.0068
This table shows a cross-country comparison of the values we compute for ln T̂oT A:j , our “terms of trade
sensitivity” index. Note that this variable is agreement-specific. For countries that join multiple FTAs
during the sample, we show the mean value across the different agreements.
Table B.2: Correlations between TOT indices, export supply elasticities, and MFN tariffs
Raw correlations (# obs. = 655)







ln T̂oT A: j 1
Exp. supply elasticity (Nicita et al) 0.460 1
Exp. supply elasticity (Broda et al) 0.300 0.732 1
MFN tariff 0.396 0.247 0.572 1
ln T̂oT A:j is our “terms of trade sensitivity” index, described in Section 3.2. “Export supply elasticity (Nicita et
al)” and “Export supply elasticity (Broda et al)” respectively refer to external estimates of export supply
elasticities facing each importer taken from Nicita et al. (2018) and Broda et al. (2008). As these first three
variables are intended as inverse measures of market power, we would expect them to be positively correlated
with one another and with ln T̂oT A:j . “MFN tariff” is the log of “(1 + MFN tariff)”. We would expect it to be
negatively correlated with these other variables. There are 655 observations for which ln T̂oT A:j , MFN tariff, and
the Nicita et al. (2018) export supply elasticity measure are jointly available. Correlations between the Broda
et al. (2008) export supply elasticity measure and the other variables are computed using only 17 observations.
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Table B.3: Out-of-sample Validation Results
Selected Prediction Models and Model Fit Results
Model Included variables ρ0 ρ1 R2
Baseline First Stage Pair FEs, ln T̂oT A: j ,
lnDIST, log GDPi, log GDP j ,
LEGAL
0.092*** 0.764*** 0.174
Drop LEGAL† First Stage Pair FEs, ln T̂oT A: j ,
lnDIST, log GDPi, log GDP j
0.091*** 0.771*** 0.178
Drop LEGAL & First Stage Pair FEs ln T̂oT A: j , lnDIST, log GDPi,
log GDP j
0.150*** 0.577*** 0.051
Drop LEGAL & ln T̂oT A: j First Stage Pair FEs, lnDIST,
log GDPi, log GDP j
0.040 0.855*** 0.158
Drop LEGAL & lnDIST First Stage Pair FEs, ln T̂oT A: j
log GDPi, log GDP j
0.105** 0.712*** 0.071
Drop LEGAL & GDPs First Stage Pair FEs, ln T̂oT A: j ,
lnDIST
0.065** 0.799*** 0.085
This table compares the predictive power of alternative models that can be used to make out-of-sample FTA predictions. To
predict FTA effects out-of-sample, we drop one agreement at a time, then fit the indicated model based on the remaining
agreements. The reported coefficients are from a regression of our first stage estimates on the predicted FTA effects
obtained from out-of-sample prediction. ρ1 is the correlation from this regression and ρ0 is the constant. The R2 is used to
judge goodness-of-fit. Results across the last 4 models are similar if we continue to include LEGAL. * p < 0.10 , **
p < .05 , *** p < .01. † denotes our preferred model. See the Supplementary Appendix for further details.
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Table B.4: Supplementary Aggregate FTA Estimates with Varying Leads and Lags
No lags or
leads
2 & 4 year
lags; 2 year
leads
3 & 6 year
lags; 3 year
leads
4 & 8 year
lags; 4 year
leads
5 & 10 year
lags; 5 year
leads
6 & 12 year
lags; 6 year
leads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(lead effects)
FT Ai j,t+6 -0.064
(0.096)
FT Ai j,t+5 -0.036
(0.093)
FT Ai j,t+4 -0.006
(0.086)
FT Ai j,t+3 0.034
(0.078)
FT Ai j,t+2 0.052
(0.074)
(main effect)
FT Ai j,t 0.188** -0.001 0.031 0.074 0.107* 0.134**
(0.091) (0.036) (0.044) (0.051) (0.060) (0.068)
(lagged effects)
FT Ai j,t−2 0.069***
(0.027)
FT Ai j,t−4 0.183*** 0.179***
(0.048) (0.041)
FT Ai j,t−3 0.146***
(0.041)
FT Ai j,t−6 0.113** 0.174***
(0.044) (0.051)
FT Ai j,t−8 0.066
(0.046)
FT Ai j,t−5 0.182***
(0.045)
FT Ai j,t−10 0.042
(0.035)
FT Ai j,t−12 0.025
(0.043)
N 58,989 58,989 58,989 58,989 58,989 58,989
This table shows supplementary aggregate first stage FTA estimates (based on eq. (5)) with varying lag and lead terms. Standard errors
(clustered by exporter, importer, and year) are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01.
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Table B.5: Robustness: Varying the first stage
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
Drop later agreements No lags in the first stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First stage pair FE† -0.234*** -0.478*** -0.300*** -0.174*** -0.348*** -0.262***
(0.040) (0.057) (0.094) (0.031) (0.038) (0.051)
ln T̂oT A:j -21.490*** -11.421*** -9.937** -10.587** -22.411*** -11.599*** -8.420* -13.723***
(3.543) (4.020) (3.932) (4.356) (3.551) (4.126) (4.412) (4.497)
Extensive margin of trade 1.052*** 0.580 0.388 -0.830** 1.094*** 0.578** 0.404* -0.396
(0.224) (0.357) (0.327) (0.399) (0.149) (0.227) (0.213) (0.267)
ln DIST -0.628*** -0.213* -0.422*** -0.228***
(0.052) (0.124) (0.038) (0.073)
CONTIG 0.199* 0.077 0.161* -0.025
(0.105) (0.128) (0.086) (0.093)
COLONY -0.098 -0.070 -0.028 0.013
(0.119) (0.123) (0.086) (0.093)
LANG 0.293*** 0.174 0.119 0.103
(0.099) (0.109) (0.074) (0.081)
LEGAL 0.037 0.107 0.124* 0.230***
(0.086) (0.092) (0.065) (0.070)
Prior Agreement -0.225** -0.092 -0.233*** -0.022
(0.105) (0.081) (0.050) (0.081)
Exporter (log) Real GDP 0.259*** 0.169*** 0.178*** 0.148***
(0.049) (0.051) (0.030) (0.033)
Importer (log) Real GDP 0.257*** 0.155*** -0.127* 0.157*** 0.120*** -0.102***
(0.032) (0.047) (0.065) (0.022) (0.026) (0.038)
Exporter (log) GDP per capita -0.087 0.090 -0.053 0.004
(0.121) (0.145) (0.066) (0.091)
Importer (log) GDP per capita 0.164** 0.324*** 0.084 0.138*** 0.186** 0.072
(0.064) (0.105) (0.096) (0.041) (0.072) (0.067)
Constant 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.271*** 0.276***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023)
Agreement FEs x x
Agr.×pair FEs x x
Observations 560 560 560 560 908 908 908 908
R2 0.132 0.373 0.524 0.752 0.076 0.274 0.435 0.735
Within R2 0.129 0.105 0.124 0.063
Second stage estimates are obtained using OLS with robust standard errors (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is βA:d, an
estimated direction-specific FTA partial effect which we have estimated in a prior first stage. This table experiments with different ways
of addressing the issue that we cannot explicitly estimate lagged effects for the later (post-2001) agreements in our sample. Columns 1-4
demonstrates what our main second stage results look like if we simply drop these later agreements (thereby reducing our second stage
sample to 560 observations). Columns 5-8 are based on an alternative first stage where we ignore lags altogether. In columns 1, 2, 5, and
6, all variables are de-meaned with respect to their within-sample mean. This allows us to interpret the regression constant as reflecting
the overall average FTA estimate after netting out the average effects of each of the included covariates. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , ***
p < .01. † Also accounts for “globalization” effects. See text for further details.
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Table B.6: Robustness: Varying the lag interval used in the first stage
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
Use 3 year lags Use 4 year lags Use 6 year lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First stage pair FE† -0.359*** -0.265*** -0.362*** -0.261*** -0.384*** -0.271***
(0.040) (0.054) (0.041) (0.056) (0.042) (0.057)
ln T̂oT A:j -8.927*** -7.535** -9.182*** -10.208*** -7.626** -9.315*** -10.931*** -7.287** -9.207***
(2.784) (2.991) (3.028) (2.891) (3.094) (3.126) (2.998) (3.206) (3.278)
Extensive margin of trade 0.569** 0.411* -0.512* 0.575** 0.393 -0.538* 0.528** 0.329 -0.632**
(0.248) (0.232) (0.285) (0.255) (0.239) (0.294) (0.265) (0.249) (0.303)
ln DIST -0.439*** -0.235*** -0.439*** -0.236*** -0.472*** -0.254***
(0.041) (0.077) (0.042) (0.079) (0.045) (0.081)
CONTIG 0.143 -0.029 0.171* -0.011 0.187* 0.000
(0.090) (0.102) (0.092) (0.103) (0.096) (0.105)
COLONY 0.033 0.077 0.028 0.080 0.012 0.079
(0.094) (0.104) (0.097) (0.108) (0.103) (0.113)
LANG 0.092 0.073 0.098 0.070 0.107 0.063
(0.079) (0.092) (0.081) (0.093) (0.082) (0.096)
LEGAL 0.160** 0.247*** 0.156** 0.248*** 0.181** 0.277***
(0.071) (0.075) (0.073) (0.078) (0.076) (0.081)
Prior Agreement -0.193*** 0.001 -0.239*** -0.006 -0.266*** 0.008
(0.054) (0.085) (0.055) (0.086) (0.057) (0.085)
Exporter (log) Real GDP 0.184*** 0.140*** 0.190*** 0.145*** 0.214*** 0.160***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038)
Importer (log) Real GDP 0.147*** 0.095*** -0.123*** 0.141*** 0.090*** -0.133*** 0.152*** 0.094*** -0.148***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.040) (0.025) (0.029) (0.041) (0.026) (0.030) (0.044)
Exporter (log) GDP per capita -0.073 -0.007 -0.067 -0.002 -0.073 0.007
(0.076) (0.102) (0.080) (0.106) (0.082) (0.107)
Importer (log) GDP per capita 0.144*** 0.200** 0.091 0.157*** 0.216** 0.101 0.185*** 0.263*** 0.135*
(0.045) (0.081) (0.074) (0.047) (0.085) (0.076) (0.048) (0.086) (0.078)
Constant 0.342*** 0.349*** 0.343***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Agreement FEs x x x
Agr.×pair FEs x x x
Observations 908 908 908 908 908 908 908 908 908
R2 0.260 0.417 0.728 0.255 0.416 0.729 0.271 0.432 0.732
Within R2 0.111 0.075 0.106 0.080 0.114 0.095
Second stage estimates are obtained using OLS with robust standard errors (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is βA:d, an estimated
direction-specific FTA partial effect which we have estimated in a prior first stage. This table shows how our main second stage results varying when
we use different lag intervals in the first stage. In columns 1, 4, and 7, all variables are de-meaned with respect to their within-sample mean. This
allows us to interpret the regression constant as reflecting the overall average FTA estimate after netting out the average effects of each of the
included covariates. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. See text for further details.
B.5
Table B.7: Robustness: Alternative Terms of Trade Sensitivity Measures I
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
Use Terms of Trade Sensitivity for CUs as a whole Use Bilateral Differences in ToT sensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First stage pair FE† -0.196*** -0.372*** -0.262*** -0.224*** -0.389*** -0.261***
(0.034) (0.041) (0.057) (0.036) (0.041) (0.057)
ln T̂oT
CU
A:j -17.259*** -10.903*** -7.639** -9.337***
(2.454) (2.941) (3.105) (3.192)
∆ ln T̂oT A:i j 9.739*** 5.751*** 5.588*** 4.711***
(1.719) (1.896) (1.777) (1.642)
Extensive margin of trade 1.164*** 0.557** 0.350 -0.572* 1.131*** 0.498* 0.380 -0.573*
(0.170) (0.263) (0.246) (0.304) (0.177) (0.265) (0.245) (0.303)
ln DIST -0.456*** -0.240*** -0.443*** -0.232***
(0.044) (0.081) (0.043) (0.080)
CONTIG 0.185** -0.003 0.212** -0.006
(0.093) (0.103) (0.096) (0.102)
COLONY 0.016 0.076 0.018 0.082
(0.100) (0.111) (0.102) (0.113)
LANG 0.112 0.074 0.140* 0.067
(0.081) (0.093) (0.082) (0.095)
LEGAL 0.160** 0.261*** 0.167** 0.257***
(0.075) (0.080) (0.076) (0.079)
Prior Agreement -0.264*** -0.002 -0.283*** 0.031
(0.055) (0.085) (0.056) (0.086)
Exporter (log) Real GDP 0.202*** 0.152*** 0.213*** 0.153***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
Importer (log) Real GDP 0.146*** 0.091*** -0.139*** 0.151*** 0.083*** -0.139***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.043) (0.025) (0.030) (0.043)
Exporter (log) GDP per capita -0.067 0.002 -0.074 0.001
(0.083) (0.108) (0.083) (0.107)
Importer (log) GDP per capita 0.173*** 0.235*** 0.118 0.155*** 0.218** 0.117
(0.048) (0.086) (0.078) (0.047) (0.085) (0.079)
Constant 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026)
Agreement FEs x x
Agr.×pair FEs x x
Observations 908 908 908 908 908 908 908 908
R2 0.078 0.262 0.424 0.729 0.071 0.258 0.427 0.729
Within R2 0.108 0.086 0.111 0.086
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is βA:d, an estimated direction-specific FTA partial effect which
we have estimated in a prior first stage. In columns 1-4 of this table, whenever the importer belongs to a customs union, ln T̂oT
CU
A:j is
computed using the terms of trade sensitivity index for the customs union as a whole, rather than for each individual member of the
customs union. In columns 5-8, we use the bilateral difference in computed ln T̂oT A:j indices within each pair, rather than using only the
importer’s ln T̂oT A:j term. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. See text for further details.
B.6
Table B.8: Robustness: Alternate Terms of Trade Sensitivity Measures II
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
Use Alt. Terms of Trade Sensitivity Use World Import Demand Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First stage pair FE† -0.191*** -0.374*** -0.261*** -0.234*** -0.392*** -0.269***
(0.034) (0.041) (0.058) (0.038) (0.042) (0.058)
ln T̂oT
alt
A:j -81.795*** -52.243*** -24.763 -47.880***
(13.336) (14.969) (16.168) (16.986)
Importer’s share of world imports 5.568*** 3.859** 5.028*** 6.635***
(1.335) (1.734) (1.469) (1.971)
Extensive margin of trade 1.037*** 0.530** 0.326 -0.626** 0.927*** 0.408 0.296 -0.454
(0.167) (0.265) (0.247) (0.305) (0.166) (0.267) (0.242) (0.309)
ln DIST -0.455*** -0.246*** -0.459*** -0.255***
(0.044) (0.081) (0.044) (0.081)
CONTIG 0.179* -0.008 0.209** -0.005
(0.094) (0.103) (0.097) (0.104)
COLONY 0.019 0.079 0.019 0.069
(0.101) (0.112) (0.102) (0.113)
LANG 0.113 0.071 0.119 0.052
(0.082) (0.094) (0.084) (0.096)
LEGAL 0.166** 0.261*** 0.171** 0.258***
(0.076) (0.080) (0.077) (0.079)
Prior Agreement -0.263*** 0.016 -0.272*** 0.045
(0.055) (0.085) (0.055) (0.085)
Exporter (log) Real GDP 0.200*** 0.146*** 0.204*** 0.148***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037)
Importer (log) Real GDP 0.151*** 0.096*** -0.137*** 0.131*** 0.055 -0.170***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.043) (0.029) (0.034) (0.044)
Exporter (log) GDP per capita -0.080 -0.012 -0.091 -0.001
(0.081) (0.107) (0.080) (0.107)
Importer (log) GDP per capita 0.181*** 0.243*** 0.131* 0.143*** 0.206** 0.101
(0.049) (0.087) (0.076) (0.052) (0.086) (0.075)
Constant 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026)
Agreement FEs x x
Agr.×pair FEs x x
Observations 908 908 908 908 908 908 908 908
R2 0.071 0.260 0.422 0.729 0.067 0.256 0.427 0.732
Within R2 0.104 0.085 0.112 0.096
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is βA:d, an estimated direction-specific FTA partial effect which
we have estimated in a prior first stage. In columns 1-4, we compute ln T̂oT
alt
A:j using an alternate formulation for the change in terms of
trade based on Caliendo & Parro (2015) after first imposing balanced trade. In columns 5-8, we use the importer’s share of world
imports. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. See text for further details.
B.7
Table B.9: Second Stage Estimates: Include Import Demand Elasticity
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First stage pair FE† -0.190*** -0.370*** -0.262***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.057)
ln T̂oT A:j -17.364*** -10.791*** -6.807** -8.816***
(2.465) (2.996) (3.205) (3.311)
Extensive margin of trade 1.126*** 0.558** 0.382 -0.521*
(0.168) (0.261) (0.244) (0.305)
Import Demand Elasticity 0.088*** 0.009 -0.067** -0.078**
(0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036)










Prior Agreement -0.263*** 0.023
(0.056) (0.086)
Exporter (log) Real GDP 0.201*** 0.149***
(0.035) (0.038)
Importer (log) Real GDP 0.144*** 0.105*** -0.119***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.045)
Exporter (log) GDP per capita -0.070 -0.003
(0.082) (0.108)






Observations 908 908 908 908
R2 0.088 0.261 0.427 0.732
Within R2 0.112 0.096
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is βA:d, an estimated
direction-specific FTA partial effect which we have estimated in a prior first stage. “Import Demand
Elasticity” refers to aggregate (manufacturing) import demand elasticity estimates constructed using
country-specific 3 digit HS import demand elasticities taken from Broda et al. (2006). * p < 0.10 , **
p < .05 , *** p < .01. See text for further details.
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Table B.10: Robustness: Alternate Weighting Methods (FGLS & WLS)
Dependent variable: First stage directional FTA estimates
FGLS WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First stage pair FE† -0.183*** -0.348*** -0.259*** -0.142*** -0.281*** -0.225***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.055) (0.023) (0.029) (0.036)
ln T̂oT A:j -16.489*** -9.659*** -7.339** -8.787*** -20.408*** -11.600*** -6.076 -6.313
(2.320) (2.675) (3.142) (3.184) (3.091) (3.447) (3.797) (4.081)
Extensive margin of trade 1.061*** 0.518** 0.336 -0.555* 0.672*** 0.381** 0.208 -0.378
(0.157) (0.234) (0.242) (0.296) (0.131) (0.191) (0.204) (0.260)
ln DIST -0.416*** -0.238*** -0.319*** -0.216***
(0.040) (0.079) (0.033) (0.065)
CONTIG 0.169** -0.008 0.121* -0.079
(0.086) (0.101) (0.072) (0.083)
COLONY 0.014 0.078 -0.006 0.097
(0.093) (0.109) (0.075) (0.089)
LANG 0.110 0.073 0.096 0.058
(0.075) (0.092) (0.061) (0.079)
LEGAL 0.122* 0.255*** 0.060 0.147**
(0.068) (0.078) (0.055) (0.059)
Prior Agreement -0.244*** 0.000 -0.194*** -0.002
(0.052) (0.083) (0.044) (0.058)
Exporter (log) Real GDP 0.194*** 0.152*** 0.163*** 0.130***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.025) (0.030)
Importer (log) Real GDP 0.142*** 0.091*** -0.135*** 0.120*** 0.087*** -0.094***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.042) (0.018) (0.021) (0.035)
Exporter (log) GDP per capita -0.104 -0.005 -0.179*** -0.092
(0.068) (0.105) (0.046) (0.075)
Importer (log) GDP per capita 0.150*** 0.231*** 0.124 0.092*** 0.174*** 0.192***
(0.043) (0.084) (0.077) (0.034) (0.064) (0.062)
Constant 0.328*** 0.334*** 0.255*** 0.298***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Agreement FEs x x
Agr.×pair FEs x x
Observations 908 908 908 908 908 908 908 908
R2 0.075 0.256 0.423 0.727 0.075 0.256 0.423 0.727
Within R2 0.108 0.086 0.108 0.086
Second stage estimates in columns 1-4 are obtained using an efficient Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method proposed by
Hanushek (1974) for cases in which the dependent variable has been estimated with error in a prior stage. Estimates in columns 5-8 are
obtained using Weighted Least Squares (WLS), weighted by inverse first stage standard error. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. See text for further details.
Table B.11: Decomposition of Variance in FTA Effects
Source of variance:
Estimation: Across agreements Pairs within agreements Within pairs
OLS 0.355 0.349 0.296
FGLS 0.350 0.346 0.304
WLS 0.344 0.340 0.316
This table offers “analysis of variance” results for each of the three weighting methods that we employ,
focusing on how much variation in our first stage directional estimates represents heterogeneity that we
observe across agreements versus within agreements, and within pairs. Our results reveal that the three
weighting methods suggest very similar variance decompositions.
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